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Although public speaking anxiety is one of the most commonly reported causes of
both clinical and non-clinical anxiety, many of the currently used questionnaire measures
of public speaking anxiety do not reflect the advances made in recent decades regarding
empirical methods of test construction, including item generation and determination of
subscale composition. The current study administered 35 empirically-generated cognitive
self-statement items related to speaking anxiety to a sample of 367 undergraduate
students along with measures of public speaking anxiety, fear of negative evaluation,
generalized social anxiety behaviors, and self-consciousness tendencies. Using
exploratory factor analysis and item-total correlations, participant responses to the 35
self-statement items were examined, producing the 30-item Speaking Cognitions and
Attention Scale (SCAS). Data indicated that in the current sample the SCAS displayed a
three-factor solution, with factors composed of items reflecting positive self-statements,
negative self-statements, and catastrophic self-statements. The scale also demonstrated
excellent internal reliability, with alphas in the range of .90 to .97. Discriminant validity
analyses supported the specificity of the measure in measuring public speaking anxiety
by correlating highly with another measure of speaking anxiety, at a moderate level with
measures of general social anxiety, and at a small level with a measure of selfconsciousness with no theoretical relationship to speaking anxiety. Results are discussed
i

with respect to implications of the current findings for questionnaire measurement of
public speaking anxiety, needed future directions in further validation of the measure, and
potential applications for treatment of public speaking anxiety.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Social performance situations, such as meeting a stranger for the first time or
speaking before a group of people, arouse subjective experiences of anxiety in many
individuals. The National Comorbidity Survey, a large scale epidemiological survey
focusing on mental health issues, found that 38.6% of the sample reported experiencing
some sort of social fear; of that number, 34.5% met criteria for a DSM-III-R diagnosis of
social phobia, a disorder in which social fears cause clinically significant distress and
behavioral avoidance (Kessler, Stein, & Berglund, 1998). Hofmann and Barlow (2004)
note that social phobia is the most common anxiety disorder and the third most common
mental health complaint in the general population. Social and performance anxiety can be
aroused by a variety of social situations, with wide variation between sufferers in regards
to which scenarios are most distressing. One of the most consistently reported anxietyproducing situations is public speaking, which can arouse strong anxious responding even
in individuals who experience little or no anxiety in other social interactions (Pollard &
Henderson, 1988). A randomized survey of 499 subjects about public speaking fears
found that one-third of respondents reported being “much more nervous than other
people” while speaking to an audience (Stein, Walker, & Forde, 1996), a figure which
closely matches the 30.2% lifetime prevalence rate of public speaking anxiety reported
by the National Comorbidity Survey (Kessler, Stein, & Berglund, 1998).
Public speaking anxiety is classified by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, 4th edition (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as a
type of specific social phobia. Specific social phobias are distinguished from generalized
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social phobia by considering the pervasiveness of the situation that arouses the anxious
responses. Individuals with generalized social phobia will experience cognitive and
physiological indicators of anxiety and exhibit behavioral avoidance tendencies in
response to a broad spectrum of social interaction and performance situations, while
individuals with specific social phobia will display this pattern only in a narrow subset of
social situations and function without marked distress in all others. Public speaking
anxiety, therefore, has been commonly operationalized (Kessler, Stein, & Berglund,
1998) as the regular experience of extreme discomfort during, or avoidance of, social
performance situations in which the individual is the subject of scrutiny by multiple
others who are primarily passive observers or evaluators rather than active interactional
participants.
This general construct has also been studied intensively by speech communication
researchers, who conceptualize it under a general class of behavioral phenomena labeled
communication apprehension. McCroskey (1977) defines communication apprehension
as “an individual‟s level of fear or anxiety associated with either real or anticipated
communication with another person or persons” (p. 78). Considered as such, this
definition overlaps with the one offered above by empirical psychology in identifying
cognitively-experienced anxiety as the cause of social difficulties, but differs in
identifying more broadly defined concerns about communication as the sole source of
this anxiety, rather than also incorporating differences related to situational aspects.
However, McCroskey (1977) does acknowledge variation in experiences of
communication apprehension, particularly the existence of specifically public-speaking
focused apprehension, and researchers investigating communication apprehension (e.g.
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Beatty & Behnke, 1991; Boohar & Seiler, 1982; Burgoon & LePoire, 1993; Greene &
Sparks, 1983) have been diligent in operationalizing the contexts in which they have
chosen to examine the construct. Therefore, enough points of comparison exist between
the psychological and communication constructions that research in either field can be
considered informative to the theoretical foundations of the other. The current review will
seek primarily to consider communication apprehension findings within the context of
the psychological literature on public speaking and social anxiety in general.
Although public speaking anxiety is common, it can carry insidious
consequences. As noted above, moderate or severe levels of social and performance
anxiety are typically accompanied by attempts to avoid the feared social situation
(Hofmann & Barlow, 2004; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). When the focus of anxiety is
public speaking, such avoidance tendencies can be significant barriers to educational and
occupational attainment, as speeches and public presentations have become increasingly
common elements of college curricula and many middle-class occupations. Rodebaugh
and Chambless (2004) provide a prototypical example in discussing the treatment of a
speech-anxious client whose symptoms were causing him to avoid pursuing a graduate
education because of the likelihood that he would be required to make public
presentations.
Empirical evidence indicates that this state of affairs is far from uncommon for
those who suffer from public speaking anxiety. Among speech-anxious respondents to
the survey conducted by Stein, Walker, and Forde (1996), 17% reported that their speech
anxiety had an adverse effect on their educational, occupational, or social functioning. A
review by McCroskey (1977) on the educational effects of communication apprehension
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notes that students reporting high levels of communication apprehension frequently
report lower grade point averages and scores on standardized testing, suggesting that
communication fears may constitute a significant impediment to learning while in school.
Supporting this assertion, Boohar and Seiler (1982) found that students in an
undergraduate bioethics course who scored highly on a measure of communication
apprehension received lower grades on exams and term papers and were less likely to
consult with the instructor during available office hours. The authors posited that
apprehension or anxiety about verbal communication, along with reducing learning, may
cause instructors to take a more negative view of a student‟s motivation to achieve or
master the material. When one considers such findings in the light of the high prevalence
of public speaking anxiety, it becomes clear that its deleterious effects can reach far
beyond the experience at the podium.
Fortunately, public speaking anxiety is a condition that has proven to be highly
amenable to explanation and treatment. As a form of specific social anxiety (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994), public speaking anxiety can be understood using current
explanatory theoretical models of social phobia (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997), which emphasize the interaction between internal cognitive factors and
overt behavioral elements in creating and sustaining the anxious response. These
cognitive-behavioral models, designed to prevent a flexible description of anxiety
processes, are thought to generalize even to instances of subclinical anxiety (Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997). Accompanying these advances in theoretical formulation, social
anxiety treatment has become both more effective and more efficient (Bitran & Barlow,
2004; Hofmann & Barlow, 2004; Rodebaugh & Chambless, 2004). Short-term treatment
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that focuses on cognitively-based interpretations and controlled behavioral exposure to
feared situations now represents the gold standard for treatment of social and
performance anxiety (Bitran & Barlow, 2004), even supplanting pharmacotherapy, which
may actively interfere with the extinction of the behavioral response (Birk, 2004).
Despite the substantial gains discussed above, there is still room for improvement
in the theoretical and clinical literature on public speaking anxiety. In large part, such
improvements will take the form of refining the existing theoretical framework and
treatment to better incorporate specific idiographic features that differentiate between the
various subtypes of social and performance anxiety. A key first step toward
accomplishing this is the formulation of measures specifically targeted towards assessing
such subtypes using empirically derived and externally valid methods. The development
of reliable and valid measures of specific subtypes of social anxiety that possess strong
discriminant and construct validity will allow for more targeted assessment and will
consequently open the door to more focused and individualized treatment.
The current research aims to develop and validate a self-report measure
specifically designed to assess public speaking anxiety. Existing measures of public
speaking anxiety (e.g. Hofmann & DiBartolo, 2000; Paul, 1966) suffer from limitations
that result from not having been developed using empirical methods of item generation or
not having been specifically developed to measure anxiety about public speaking. The
current study attempts to avoid these faults by employing an empirically-based and
naturalistic method of item generation known as the thought-listing method (Cacioppo,
Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979; Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997) in which scale items are
distilled from actual thoughts experienced by speech-anxious individuals engaged in a
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public speaking task. Another shortcoming of existing self-report assessments of public
speaking anxiety is that most assess only the positive or negative emotional experiences
(hereafter referred to using the term “affective valence”) associated with public speaking.
However, a growing body of empirical and theoretical work examining the effects of
focusing attention toward the self or toward other people during a social encounter (e.g.
Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Woody, 1996; Woody
& Rodriguez, 2000) suggests that assessing affective valence alone without considering
focus of attention might provide an incomplete picture of speaking anxiety. The public
speaking anxiety measure to be developed and validated by this study will address this by
explicitly including an attentional focus component. The ultimate goal of the current
study is to use empirical methods to validate a self-report measure of public speaking
anxiety that is grounded in the current empirical and theoretical literature on the subject
and to obtain preliminary psychometric data on the reliability, validity, and factor
structure of this measure.
Understanding Public Speaking Anxiety
The Contribution of Cognitive Theory
Over the past several decades, cognitive theory has maintained a position of
widespread influence in conceptualizations of maladaptive or distressing mental
conditions, including anxiety (e.g. Beck & Clark, 1997; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg,
1985; Bruch, Mattia, Heimberg, & Holt, 1993; Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo
& Becker, 1990). According to Beck (1976), the central innovation of cognitive theory is
the idea that thoughts and thought processes exert a great degree of influence over
behaviors and emotions. By extension, distressing or maladaptive behaviors and emotions
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can be linked to specific thoughts. Cognitive therapy seeks to alleviate mental distress by
changing or reinterpreting such thoughts (Beck, 1976).
Of particular importance in cognitive theory are “automatic thoughts,” or
emotion-eliciting thoughts that occur outside of the individual‟s conscious control. Beck
(1976) describes automatic thoughts as interpretations of events which are regarded as
plausible or likely by the individual but are actually not based in fact. In many cases,
automatic thoughts take the form of a statement regarding the individual‟s ability to cope
effectively with the situation at hand and the implications of success or failure in doing so
(Beck, 1976). These self-relevant automatic thoughts are commonly referred to as selfstatements (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995).
With regard to the anxiety disorders, cognitive theory theorizes that specific selfstatements and other automatic thoughts cause the individual to feel that he or she is in
some sort of danger (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Ingram & Kendall, 1987), which
in turn activates the constellation of physiological and affective arousal reactions that
comprise the anxiety response (Beck & Clark, 1997). Research into self-statements has
therefore been of particular interest to investigators seeking to provide empirical support
for this model. Since social anxiety research has consistently found that highly socially
anxious individuals under-rate their social performance relative to observer ratings
(Alden & Wallace, 1995; Rapee & Lim, 1992; Rodebaugh & Rapee, 2005; Stopa &
Clark, 1993; Wallace & Alden, 1991), most research into the role of self-statements in
social anxiety has focused on the hypothesis that negative statements about one‟s social
self-efficacy perpetuate socially anxious responding.
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Harrell, Chambless, and Calhoun (1981) examined the correlational relationship
between self-statements and affect by presenting undergraduate participants with a series
of hypothetical situations involving interpersonal conflict, such as being criticized or
rejected by another person. After reading each situation, the participants were instructed
to rate a series of prototypical self-statements designed to express anger, anxiety,
suspicion, depression, or rational responding, in terms of how likely they would be to
express that self-statement in response to the situation. Additionally, participants were
provided with a list of five affective states that reflected the same categories of anger,
anxiety, suspiciousness, depression, and rationality. The results of the study indicated
that, as hypothesized, the specific self-statements were highly correlated with their
corresponding affective states. Additionally, individuals who rated the anxious selfstatements as being more characteristic of them received higher scores on the Fear of
Negative Evaluation Scale and the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (Watson &
Friend, 1969), both of which are measures of social anxiety. Finally, the self-statements
designated as “rational” by the researchers exhibited an inverse association with the
affective states designated as “maladaptive” (anger, anxiety, suspiciousness, and
depression). Despite the methodological shortcomings resulting from the study being
correlational in nature and not employing any behavioral measures, these results are
consistent with the cognitive model‟s claims (Beck, 1976; Ingram & Kendall, 1987) that
self-statements and affective states relate closely to one another.
Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, and Dombeck (1990) utilized a more experimentallybased approach to the study of negative self-statements in social anxiety. These
researchers modified the classic Stroop color naming task using words as stimuli. The
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stimulus words were chosen to reflect social anxiety-related themes of failure and
inadequacy or panic disorder-related themes of physical illness and somatic
dysregulation. Emotionally neutral words were also included as controls. A sample of
socially phobic and panic-disordered individuals were exposed to these words and asked
to identify the color of the ink that each was written in. Consistent with hypotheses,
results indicated that socially phobic individuals exhibited greater response latencies on
social threat words than for physical threat words or neutral words; while panicdisordered individuals exhibited greater response latencies when physical threat words
were presented as compared to the other two categories. This pattern of results suggests
that socially-phobic individuals may process information in a manner that is biased
toward social stimuli which carry negative or threatening connotations, which is
consistent with the predictions of cognitive theory (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985).
Mahone, Bruch, and Heimberg (1993) conducted a study in which undergraduate
men engaged in a brief interaction with a female confederate. As the subjects awaited the
interaction, they were asked to make separate listings of thoughts they were having about
themselves (self-statements) and thoughts they were having about their interaction
partner. Subjects also provided ratings of their subjective feelings of anxiety and their
self-efficacy in regards to making a favorable impression on their interaction partner.
Results indicated that the percentage of reported negative self-statements was inversely
related to social self-efficacy and positively related to subjective anxiety during the
interaction. Percentage of negative self-statements was also a significant predictor of
scores on the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969). The results
of this study provide more empirical support for the cognitive model‟s assertion that
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negative self-statements in social situations are a key component of social anxiety (Beck,
1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985).
In a replication and expansion of Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg‟s (1993) study,
Beazley, Glass, Chambless, & Arnkoff (2001) measured self-statements in social phobics
across three different types of social situations. Participants reported self-statements in
connection with an interaction with a partner of the same sex, an interaction with an
opposite-sex partner, and a public speaking situation. Results indicated that the situation
exhibited a significant effect on the associated pattern of cognitions, particularly when
the interaction situations were compared to the public speaking situation. Social phobics
reported more negative thoughts and fewer positive thoughts in the public speaking
situation than in the interaction scenarios. Additionally, negative self-statements were
found to correlate highly with participant self-ratings of poor social skill and observer
ratings of higher anxiety and poorer social skill. Based on these findings, the authors
recommend that more attention be paid to the effects of specific social situations on
eliciting anxiety, and recommended that a wider variety of behavioral situations be
employed to study generalized social phobia experimentally.
A critical prediction of cognitive theory is that anxiety problems can be
successfully treated by changing their associated negative self-statements (Beck, 1976;
Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). Chambless, Tran, and Glass (1997) examined
predictors of response to a group-based cognitive-behavioral treatment for social phobia.
After completing a course of this treatment, participants completed a variety of
questionnaire-based measures along with behavioral tasks such as giving a public speech
and interacting with an experimental confederate. Results indicated that cognitive
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changes involving decreased negative thinking during social behavior were associated
with decreases in self-reported anxiety in both public speaking and dyadic interactions
immediately after the end of treatment. However, the research hypothesis that cognitive
changes would predict maintenance of treatment gains at a 6 month follow-up evaluation
was not supported, lending only mixed support to the predictions of cognitive theory.
Ayers (1988), approaching the problem of speaking anxiety from a
communication apprehension framework, also noted correlational evidence linking public
speaking anxiety to negative expectations before giving a speech and negative
evaluations afterwards. He applied these findings to an experimental paradigm in which
half of a population of students enrolled in an undergraduate public speaking class were
trained in the use of a visualization technique involving a combination of relaxation,
imaginal exposure and positive thinking to prepare for a speech. In comparison to a
control group of students that did not receive training in this method, speakers using this
technique reported less anxiety while speaking and a greater proportion of self-reported
positive thoughts during the speaking task. These findings appear to support the assertion
of cognitive theory that interventions targeted toward increasing positive thoughts about
public speaking can yield measurable reductions in anxiety.
In another experimental investigation of cognitive change, Heimberg, Dodge,
Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, and Becker (1990) compared two varieties of group treatment for
social phobia. The first of these was grounded in cognitive theory and taught subjects to
identify, analyze, and challenge their social anxiety-related automatic thoughts, while
emphasizing the need for practicing these skills in real-life social situations. The second
group, which served as a control, was psychoeducational in nature and focused on
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providing definitions and demonstrations of social phobia concepts, as well as supportive
group discussions. All subjects participated in a simulated social scenario, which was
personalized for each individual in order to increase the likelihood that it would be
anxiety-provoking, after the conclusion of the treatment and at 3- and 6- month followup. Subjects were assessed on a variety of measures of anxiety, including a self-report
listing measure of self-statements experienced during the task.
Data analysis indicated that the group receiving the cognitive treatment exhibited
greater reductions in self-reported and observer-rated anxiety in comparison to the
control treatment, and that these gains were more likely to be preserved throughout the
follow-up period. Furthermore, the patients in the cognitive condition showed greater
change in reported negative and positive self-statements between pretest and follow-up,
indicating that the observed gains were likely related to changes in patterns of cognition.
A five-year follow-up study (Heimberg, Salzman, Hope, & Blendell, 1993) with the same
sample found that the cognitive condition participants continued to display and report less
anxiety than their counterparts in the control cohort. By demonstrating via a controlled
study that cognitive changes appear to lead to changes in anxiety, this data provides
further support for the cognitive theory of anxiety (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985;
Ingram & Kendall, 1987) and its efficacy in predicting and altering socially anxious
responding.
A Theoretical Account of Behavioral Regulation
The previously reviewed research suggests that the cognitive model lends a valid
and important perspective on social anxiety. The basic claims of the cognitive model,
most notably the importance of cognitions and subjective interpretations in determining
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behavioral responses, have had wide influence in the theoretical and empirical literature
on social anxiety (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982;
Ingram & Kendall, 1987; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark,
1993), as well as in other areas. One formulation which has been profoundly influenced
by the cognitive model is self-regulation theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981; 1998), a
general model of behavior that forms the basis for the explanatory model of social
anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995) upon which this study is based.
As described by Carver and Scheier (1998), self-regulation theory is designed to
function as a high-level explanatory framework for motivated behavior. The theory is
particularly adept at generating complex conceptualizations which account for the
interactions of a variety of cognitive, behavioral, environmental, and attentional features
in determining the course of behavior. As such, the theory is intentionally broad and can
be flexibly applied to a wide variety of specific behaviors across different contexts.
Despite the high degree of flexibility and abstraction, the core features of self-regulation
theory discussed below form a stable basis for a coherent model of motivated behavior.
Standards of behavior. Self-regulation theory postulates that all motivated
behavior is an attempt to meet some sort of standard of comparison against which that
behavior can be judged. Carver & Scheier (1998) term this standard the “reference
value”, and note that this value is highly subjective. That is, reference values for a
particular behavior will vary depending on the context in which the behavior is
performed, the idiographic characteristics of the individual performing the behavior, and
the degree to which performance feedback is available. However, all reference values
serve the same basic function: providing an active standard against which the individual
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regulates his or her behavior. As such, self-regulation theory proposes that the various
elements involved in behavior regulation exist to ensure that the performed behavior
measures up to the corresponding active reference value. Self-regulation theory‟s
emphasis on the power of idiosyncratic and subjectively held values to influence
behavioral responses is highly congruent with cognitive theory‟s own claims about the
relationship between subjective cognitive interpretations and behavior (Beck, 1976;
Ingram & Kendall, 1987).
Wallace and Alden (1991) investigated the influence of standards on social
anxiety with an experimental paradigm that required controls and socially anxious
participants to converse with an opposite-sex stranger. Prior to this task, subjects were
asked to provide ratings of three standards of social performance relevant to the
interaction: their personal standard for satisfaction, their perception of the experimenter‟s
standard, and their estimate of the average standard of performance that would be
attained by others on the task. Subjects also gave a rating of the level of performance that
they expected to achieve in the interaction. Results indicated that the non-anxious
subjects set their personal standards at roughly the same level as their perception of the
experimenter‟s standards, and generally expected that they would meet or exceed all
three standards of performance. By contrast, the anxious subjects reported personal
standards that were lower than their perception of the experimenter‟s standards, and rated
their abilities as being unable to match the latter standard. This pattern of results indicates
that the discrepancy between socially anxious individuals‟ perception of their own
abilities and their perception of the standards of others may play a key role in
differentiating them from non-anxious individuals.
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Carver, Lawrence, and Scheier (1999) utilized a different approach to study the
influence of subjective standards on affective experiences. These authors outlined three
different types of self-perceptions to participants: the “ought-self,” defined as
characteristics that the individual feels that he or she should possess because of moral or
social standards, the “ideal self”, defined as characteristics that the individual would like
to possess, and the “feared self”, defined as characteristics that the individual would like
to avoid possessing. For each description, study participants were asked to list seven of
their own traits which they felt to be reflective of that variety of self-perception.
Participants then provided ratings indicating how well they felt each trait currently
described them. The same participants were subsequently administered the Affects
Balance Scale (Derogatis, 1975), a measure in which they were presented with a series of
adjectives describing a variety of emotions and asked to rate the extent to which they had
experienced each in the previous week. Results indicated that the extent to which
participants viewed themselves as conforming or not conforming to specific selfperceptions exhibited an effect on their affective experiences. Individuals who reported
that they were relatively near their “feared self” also reported high levels of anxiety, guilt,
and depression, and lower levels of happiness and contentment. Individuals who reported
larger discrepancies between their current self and their “ideal self” similarly reported
more feelings of depression and fewer feelings of happiness and contentment. An
interaction effect was found for feelings of anxiety and guilt in which discrepancies
between current self and “ought self” predicted these affective states when the individual
did not report being close to his or her “feared self,” but did not predict them when the
individual did make such a report.
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The authors interpreted this last finding as an indication that the activation of
different reference values creates different motivations for experiences of anxiety and
guilt. The researchers theorize that when proximity to the “feared self” is salient, the
affective reaction serves to motivate the individual to distance him or herself from that
state; by contrast, when the “feared self” is not salient, then the individual is more likely
to experience anxiety and guilt as a means of motivating him or herself to reduce
perceived discrepancies between the current self-perception and the “ought self” (Carver,
Lawrence & Scheier, 1999). These findings and their interpretations by the authors are
consistent with self-regulation theory‟s proposal that subjectively held standards against
which individuals evaluate themselves are a crucial variable in the understanding of
emotion and behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Carver & Scheier, 1998).
The speech communication literature parallels the psychological studies above in
investigating the role of prevailing standards in communication apprehension. Greene
and Sparks (1983) conducted a study in which groups of undergraduate students were
asked to record an audiotape of themselves arguing their opinion on a provided topic.
Half of the participants were informed that the quality of their arguments would be
evaluated by trained judges, while the other half were told the arguments were simply a
means to keep them engaged in speech while the experimenters measured their
physiological responses to speaking and that the content of their tapes would be
immediately erased. Results indicated that participants who scored highly on a measure
of communication apprehension reported significantly more anxiety in the first, more
evaluative situation than in the second, while participants who received low
communication apprehension scores reported no differences in anxiety between the two
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conditions. Greene and Sparks (1983) interpreted these results as indicating that the
effects of communication apprehension vary with the extent to which the situation is
perceived as evaluative.
An investigation by Beatty (1988) into the situational correlates of
communication apprehension found additional evidence to support the importance of
evaluative standards. The results of a correlational study conducted with undergraduate
subjects indicated that public speaking anxiety was positively predicted by the extent to
which the speakers felt that they were dissimilar or subordinate to the audience.
Furthermore, subjects who scored highly on a measure of communication apprehension
were significantly more likely to report both feeling subordinate or inferior to the
audience and being more conspicuously scrutinized by the audience. In interpreting this
latter finding, the author emphasizes the interaction between the trait-like predisposition
toward communication apprehension and the tendency to impute threatening or
judgmental characteristics to audiences; an observation which corresponds well to the
predictions of Carver and Scheier (1981).
Importance of feedback. In order to evaluate whether or not a behavior is
congruent with the current reference value, current measures of performance must be
taken. One of the most critical tenets of self-regulation theory is that motivation and
behavior are subject to constant revision based on new information, which is constantly
being received from a variety of sources. The dynamic nature of self-regulation models
leads to great emphasis being placed on feedback processes. Feedback provides a value
for current performance that can then be compared to the reference value to yield
information about whether or not behavioral adjustment is needed. The most commonly
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employed feedback mechanism to explain behavior in self-regulation models is negative
feedback. Negative feedback occurs when a discrepancy exists between the reference
value and information about performance received through feedback channels. When
such a discrepancy is detected, behavior changes in an attempt to reduce or eliminate this
discrepancy and return performance to the level of the reference value (Carver & Scheier,
1998).
Rodebaugh and Rapee (2005) conducted an experiment in which both socially
anxious and non-anxious individuals gave two short videotaped speeches. In between the
first speech and the second one, participants in the experimental condition rated how well
they believed they performed on the previous speech, and then re-rated their performance
after watching the videotape of that speech. Participants in the control condition also
rated their first speech twice, performing a filler task between ratings. For each
participant, a discrepancy score was calculated in which the participant‟s first rating of
his or her performance was compared to the average rating of two trained observers.
Analysis of the data revealed an interaction effect in which participants in the
experimental condition who displayed a markedly negative evaluation of their
performance relative to the raters evaluated their performance on the first speech more
positively after viewing the video. The finding that individuals who are biased towards
evaluating their public speaking performance negatively are more likely to re-evaluate
themselves after receiving objective feedback suggests that the nature of the feedback
being provided can display a concrete effect on self-perception and behavior, which is
highly consistent with the claims of self-regulation theory regarding the importance of
feedback (Carver & Scheier, 1981).
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Wald (2005) utilized a similar public speaking paradigm in which participants
gave two videotaped speeches before an audience. However, rather than utilizing the tape
of the speech performance itself, the experimenters provided participants with feedback
that was ostensibly from the audience but was actually standardized to provide similar
information using different framing (wording). The feedback types were as follows:
positive other-focused, which made explicit reference to the audience in noting a
supposed positive attribute of the speech; positive self-focused, which referred to the
participant‟s actions and noted a supposed positive attribute of the speech; lack of
negative other-focused, which also made explicit reference to the audience and noted a
supposed avoidance of a negative behavior during the speech; and lack of negative selffocused, which referred only to the participants actions in noting a supposed avoidance of
a negative attribute. The author also employed a control condition in which no feedback
was provided. Results indicated that the presence of feedback in any form was associated
with better predicted performance in the second speech relative to the control
participants. Additionally, a differential effect for the feedback frames was noted, in
which over all conditions, self-focused positive feedback was associated with the greatest
amount of experienced anxiety in the second speech and positive other-focused feedback
was associated with the least amount. These findings provide more evidence in support of
the influence of feedback on behavior as per self-regulation theory.
Goals. Goals constitute one of the most common sources of reference values for
behavior. Self-regulation theory holds that all behaviors are essentially attempts to either
achieve a desired outcome or avoid an undesired outcome. Goals represent the
individual‟s explicit identification of what should be accomplished by a particular
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behavior. The relationship between goals and behavior can be complex; goals are often
nested within extensive hierarchies, with high-order, abstract goals (such as “be a good
person”) subsuming lower-order, more concrete goals (such as “do not deceive your
significant other”). The hierarchical organization of goals in such a manner suggests that
the operating reference value in a behavior regulation loop may change in accordance
with changes in the current importance of different goals. If, for example, the situation
activates a lower-order goal in the hierarchy, such as “do not deceive your significant
other”, the resulting regulation of behavior against this standard will take a markedly
different form than if a higher-order goal is activated, such as “be a good person,” despite
the fact that both goals are in the same hierarchy (Carver & Scheier, 1998).
Empirical research tends to support the importance of goals in behavior regulation
as it relates to social anxiety, although findings have indicated that perceived efficacy in
achieving goals tends to be a stronger predictor of anxious behavior than the goals
themselves. In their study of standard setting in social interactions, Wallace and Alden
(1991) noted that anxious participants did not differ from non-anxious individuals in
ratings of their personal standards of performance for the interaction, but did rate
themselves as being less efficacious in achieving these goals. Kocovski and Endler
(2000) administered a battery of measures assessing social anxiety, goal-directed
behavior, and related constructs to university undergraduates. Results indicated that
individuals reporting greater social anxiety also reported lower expectations of goal
achievement. Although this data is correlational in nature and therefore limited by the
inability to infer a causal relationship between the variables, the authors hypothesized
that socially anxious individuals may develop lower expectations of goal achievement as
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a defense mechanism against anxiety associated with perceptions that they are likely to
fail to achieve their goals.
Affect. Self-regulation theories also recognize that many behaviors are
accompanied by emotional experiences. The affective component that accompanies goaldirected behavior can often be quite strong, particularly in situations that are likely to
arouse anxiety. Carver and Scheier (1998) theorize that emotion is linked to a separate
but related higher-level function in the self-regulation system that monitors the
individual‟s progress in reducing discrepancies between current behavioral output and the
active reference value. In terms of this conceptualization, the critical concern is the
effectiveness of the self-regulation system as expressed by the rate of discrepancy
reduction. Affective experiences constitute a feedback channel providing this
information, with the rate of discrepancy reduction being compared to a value
representing the expected or ideal rate of reduction. When the current rate of reduction is
less than expected or when the discrepancy is perceived to be widening, negative affect
results. When the progress in reducing discrepancy is greater than expected, the affective
experience is positive. In situations where the perceived rate of progress matches the
expected rate, no emotional experience is predicted. Carver and Scheier (1998)
emphasize that affect is tied to progress or regress in the process of goal attainment, not
the actual attainment of goals.
Carver (2006) extends this conceptualization of the role of affect in selfregulation in a new direction by postulating the existence of two distinct broadly-defined
types of affect-behavior relationships. These are, respectively, affects linked to
approaching desired goals and affects linked to avoiding undesired goals. Notably, both
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varieties are conceptualized as bipolar dimensions, with the potential to produce either
positive or negative emotion. For instance, approach-related affects could be negative if
goals are not being achieved, and avoidance-related affects could be positive if attempts
to avoid undesirable outcomes are met with success. Carver (2004) found empirical
support for this theory using scales designed to assess both approach and avoidance
tendencies. Despite the fact that the items designed to measure approach tendencies
contained no reference to negative affect or threat, it was found that experimentally
manipulated situations designed to produce negative emotional experiences of sadness,
frustration, and anger through thwarting of goal-directed behavior were positively related
to approach tendencies. Negative emotional experiences of anxiety and fear produced by
situations in which participants were exposed to undesirable outcomes were positively
related to avoidance tendencies. Both results are consistent with the theorized existence
of two independent bipolar dimensions of affect, linked to approach and avoidance
tendencies.
Focus of Attention in Behavioral Self-Regulation and Social Anxiety
Perhaps the most relevant contribution of self-regulation theory (Carver &
Scheier, 1981; 1998) toward understanding socially anxious behavior is the heavy
emphasis on the behavioral effects of focus of attention. Since self-regulation theory
postulates that behavior is greatly affected by the context in which it takes place,
attentional factors are incorporated into several facets of the theory to explain how some
features of the environment become more relevant to a particular behavior than others.
Self-regulation models distinguish between goals which are essentially private and those
that are essentially public (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Private goals deal mainly with
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internal phenomena such as thoughts, desires, and self-related motivations, while public
goals are typically more concerned with issues of self-presentation in social situations.
Whether public or private goals are focused upon as the reference value for a particular
behavior depends on the situational context. Focusing on private goals tends to amplify
awareness of personally held values, while activation of public goals causes the
individual to conceptualize himself or herself as the object of others‟ perceptions. As with
any variation in reference values, activation of private versus public goals by a particular
situation changes the subsequent process of behavioral regulation. For instance, social
interactions and the anticipation of social interactions seem to cause public goals to be
activated, resulting in the adoption of a reference value that represents the expectations,
as the individual perceives them, of others in the social environment. The individual will
then evaluate the effectiveness of his or her subsequent behavior in the situation against
these norms, with the intent of minimizing discrepancies (Carver & Scheier, 1998).
Focusing attention on the self as compared to focusing on the environment seems
to be of particular importance in determining whether public or private goals are
activated in a given situation (Carver & Scheier, 1981). In particular, self-regulation
theory predicts that focusing attention toward the self increases the likelihood that public
goals such as self-presentation will be adopted as the reference value for the subsequent
behavior, with a corresponding tendency to engage in social comparison. Additionally,
self-focus is thought to cause the individual to become more sensitive to feedback that
indicates discrepancies with the social standards that serve as reference values, leading to
increased attempts at behavioral regulation and more vigilant monitoring of feedback
cues to determine the effectiveness of regulation. Experimental evidence has generally
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supported these assertions. Scheier and Carver (1983) demonstrated this tendency by
subjecting participants to a task in which they copied geometric figures from a reference
drawing. Participants performing the task under a situational manipulation designed to
increase self-focused attention looked at the reference figure more often than those in a
control condition. Subjects who scored highly on a measure of dispositional tendencies
toward self-consciousness similarly consulted the reference figure more often than
subjects with lower scores on the same measure.
The ability of self-focused attention to engage social comparison in individuals
has become an area of great interest in the empirical study of social anxiety processes
(e.g. Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Melchior & Cheek, 1990; Monfries & Kafer,
1994; Pilkonis, 1977; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000). Consistent with the
predictions of self-regulation theory, self-focused attention has been repeatedly
associated with increased social anxiety. A meta-analysis by Mor and Winquist (2002)
encompassing 226 effect sizes found that self-focus was broadly related to negative affect
and that self-focus on public goals was strongly related to social anxiety. Moreover, the
analysis indicated that self-focus on private goals (rumination), although strongly
associated with measures of depression, was only weakly related with social anxiety,
supporting the notion that the relationship between public self-focus and social anxiety
possesses some measure of specificity.
Several correlational studies have measured the relationship between social
anxiety and self-consciousness, defined as a dispositional tendency to focus on the self
(Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978). Pilkonis (1977) administered the SelfConsciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), along with a battery of
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measures of personality and social anxiety, to a sample of university undergraduates. He
found that measures of general shyness, social anxiety, and self-monitoring were
positively correlated with public self-consciousness. Additionally, individuals who
reported a greater concern with public aspects of shyness, such as awkwardness and
performance deficits, reported greater difficulty in coping with social anxiety than
individuals who primarily reported concern with private aspects of shyness, such as
subjective discomfort. Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes (1978) provide additional
support by replicating Pilkonis‟s (1977) correlations between public self-consciousness
and measures of social anxiety and self-monitoring.
Monfries & Kafer (1994) conducted a study correlating self-consciousness with a
scale designed to measure fear of negative evaluation (Watson & Friend, 1969), a
construct which has been widely linked to social anxiety both empirically and
theoretically (e.g. Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Lim,
1992; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Stopa & Clark, 1993) and a scale designed to measure
more behavioral tendencies toward social anxiety (Watson & Friend, 1969). Results
indicated that public self-consciousness correlated positively with both measures,
providing additional support for the involvement of this construct in social anxiety.
Interestingly, private self-consciousness was found to correlate positively with fear of
negative evaluation but was unrelated to socially anxious behavior. The authors suggest
that this latter finding indicates that self-consciousness over private aspects of social
interaction may activate cognitively-based correlates of social anxiety, such as fears of
criticism, while allowing the individual to avoid the behavioral features of social anxiety
that are associated with greater difficulties in social situations. These findings and
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subsequent interpretation are highly congruent with those reported by Pilkonis (1977) and
Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes (1978).
A variety of experimental and quasi-experimental studies also support the
association between self-focused attention and socially anxious behavior. Melchior and
Cheek (1990) subjected shy and non-shy female participants to a five minute interaction
with a stranger. After the interaction, participants provided an estimate of how much (in
percentage) of the conversation period they spent focusing on themselves as compared to
focusing on their partner. Participants also rated both themselves and their partners on
self-consciousness, awkwardness, inhibition, confidence, and relaxedness during the
interaction and completed a questionnaire measure of socially anxious thoughts. Subjects
who reported spending a greater percentage of the interaction self-focusing also reported
more shyness and shyness-related feelings during the interaction and scored more highly
on the measure of socially anxious thoughts. Additionally, when a shy and non-shy
individual were paired with one another, the shy individuals tended to over-rate their
shyness relative to their partner‟s rating of them, and both individuals tended to rate the
shy individual as exerting less influence on the direction of the conversation. Again, this
pattern of results is highly consistent with the theorized connection between self-focused
attention and socially anxious behavior.
In another experimental study of attentional focus in social situations, Woody
(1996) employed a unique paradigm which allowed for manipulation of attentional focus.
Socially phobic individuals were asked to give two extemporaneous speeches in front of
an audience. The participants completed the task in pairs, with one participant speaking
and the other standing passively beside the speaker. In both speeches, the speaker was
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instructed to speak about the cognitive, emotional, and physical experience of standing
before an audience, however, the focus of the speech shifted between trials. In one trial,
the speaker described his or her own experience; in the other, the speaker described the
experience of his or her passive partner. The change in speech focus, which served as the
independent variable, was intended to manipulate focus of attention. Results indicated
that when the content of the speech was focused on the passive participants, they reported
anticipating and experiencing more anxiety and were rated by observers as appearing
more anxious. Similarly, the speakers reported more anticipatory anxiety and were rated
as appearing more anxious by observers when the speech content was focused on them.
However, focus of attention was not found to affect either self-reported or audience rated
measures of social performance, such as social skill or quality of the speech. By
demonstrating that manipulating focus of attention can produce corresponding changes in
subjective anxiety, Woody‟s (1996) study provides an important measure of support for
the connection between self-focus and social anxiety.
In an extension of Woody‟s (1996) research paradigm, Woody and Rodriguez
(2000) instructed participants with social phobia and non-phobic controls to give two
extemporaneous speeches before a small audience. The task was again completed in
pairs, with one speaker and one passive participant. As in the prior study, focus of
attention was manipulated by changing the target of the speech content between the
speaker and the passive participant. Analysis of the results again revealed that
participants in both roles reported significantly greater anxiety when the content of the
speech was focused on them. Observer ratings confirmed that participants also appeared
more nervous in these conditions. Interestingly, the anxiety-increasing effect of self-
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focused attention occurred in both normal controls and socially phobic individuals,
suggesting that the relationship between attentional focus and anxiety response is not
particular to the highly anxious. The latter interpretation led the authors to theorize that
more pathological forms of social anxiety may be linked to greater individual tendencies
toward self-focus.
Woody, Chambless, and Glass (1997) employed a sample of individuals
undergoing treatment for social phobia to investigate potential effects on self-focused
attention. Results indicated that participant tendencies to self-focus decreased
significantly over the course of the treatment, while tendencies to focus attention on
external factors remained stable. Using a variety of behavioral measures administered
both pre and post-treatment, which included dyadic interactions and public speaking, the
authors found that decreases in reported anxiety on these measures corresponded with
decreased self-focus. This effect was particularly pronounced among individuals with
public speaking phobias, who reported greater improvements in their speaking anxiety
with reductions in self-focus. These results provide more empirical support for the role of
self-focus in social anxiety, along with indications that lessening self-focus yields
tangible reductions in anxiety and may constitute an important target for treatment.
In another empirical study of the role of self-focused attention in social anxiety,
Pineles and Mineka (2005) compared the responses of socially anxious participants to
non-anxious participants on a dot-probe task designed to measure reaction time to various
stimuli. In order to measure attention toward physiological cues, participants were asked
to wear a finger plethysmograph and told that a static visual representation of their
current heart rate would appear periodically on the screen alongside a similar visual
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representation of the sound of a horse neighing. The authors utilized this manipulation
with the rationale that attending to internal cues such as physiological indicators of
anxiety constitutes a variety of self-focus, as has been suggested by several cognitivebehavioral models of social anxiety (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg,
1997). Results indicated a significant effect for the socially anxious individuals
preferentially attending to the stimuli that ostensibly represented their heart rate. This
finding is consistent with Woody and Rodriguez‟s (2000) hypothesis that sociallyanxious individuals may have a dispositional tendency toward greater self-focus,
particularly because a significant difference between socially anxious and non-anxious
individuals emerged in the Pineles and Mineka (2005) study despite the fact that the
experimental task did not involve a social situation.
In addition to the variety of research findings supporting the role of self-focused
attention on social anxiety, empirical studies have also examined the ways in which
attention directed towards others can promote anxiety in social situations. In their study
of heterosocial anxiety, Mahone, Bruch, and Heimberg (1993) collected two separate
thought-listing protocols from the undergraduate men that comprised their sample. One
of these protocols instructed the participants to list thoughts they had about themselves
during the interaction, while the other requested a list of thoughts about the interaction
partner. Each list of thoughts was rated for affective valence (positive, negative, or
neutral) by trained raters. Trained raters also viewed a videotape of each interaction in
order to evaluate each subject for behavioral indicators of social anxiety as defined by a
standardized protocol. Analyses indicated that positive thoughts about the interaction
partner were a significant predictor of independently-rated behavioral indicators of social
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anxiety. This relationship remained significant even after statistically controlling for
variance associated with the participants‟ negative and positive self-thoughts. The authors
interpret this result by reasoning that focusing attention on the positive qualities of the
partner might increase the reference value for success in the interaction to a level that a
socially anxious individual might feel less capable of matching. Although the causal
claim made by this interpretation requires controlled experimental study for validation,
the implication that increasing the salience of other-related standards of performance may
promote socially anxious behavior is consistent with much of the research on the
importance of reference values in social anxiety (e.g. Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier, 1999;
Wallace & Alden, 1991).
A Self-Regulation Model of Social and Performance Anxiety
As reviewed above, the theoretical account of behavioral regulation presented by
self-regulation models (Carver & Scheier, 1981; 1998) displays a high degree of fit with
existing research on social anxiety, as do the broader principles of cognitive theory
(Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). This state of affairs provides an ideal
groundwork for a specific model of social anxiety that incorporates the substantial
contributions of both theories. Indeed, several such models have been proposed (Clark &
Wells, 1995; Ingram & Kendall, 1987; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), all of which generally
conform to the broad framework outlined by cognitive and self-regulation theory,
differentiating themselves from one another largely by the specific elements of the
theories which they choose to emphasize. Of these, the model authored by Clark and
Wells (1995) forms the foundation for the current study‟s treatment of public speaking
anxiety. In addition to emphasizing the influence of cognitive factors in determining
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reference values and interpreting performance feedback, this particular model offers a
detailed elucidation of the effects of attention on anxiety and social performance. The key
aspects of this model, how they are thought to interact with one another to account for the
experience of social anxiety, and empirical support for these claims are summarized
below.
Favorable self-presentation as a reference value. Clark and Wells‟ (1995) model
postulates that highly socially anxious individuals adopt a reference value that places a
high priority on impression management in social situations. In many cases, these
reference values are unrealistically high and can be expressed by statements such as “I
must give a flawless speech” or “Any mistakes are unacceptable.” Such reference values
are thought to set a standard for performance that drastically increases the amount of
pressure on the anxious individual as he or she confronts a social situation and effectively
constitute a predisposition to a negative discrepancy between performance feedback and
reference value.
Noting the important role of high standards in many theoretical models of social
anxiety, including Clark and Wells (1995), Alden, Bieling, and Wallace (1994)
conducted an investigation into the role of perfectionism in social anxiety. Echoing the
distinction between public and private goals outlined by self-regulation theory (Carver &
Scheier, 1998), these researchers specified two varieties of perfectionism; socially
prescribed, in which high standards are set by external expectations, and self-oriented, in
which standards are set by the individual. In order to define the relationship between
these varieties of perfectionism and socially anxious behavior, the researchers subjected
socially anxious, mildly depressed, and control subjects to a brief interaction task with an

32
opposite-sex partner. These subjects subsequently completed measures of perfectionism
and reported various aspects of their experience during the interaction, including
standards for self and perceived other‟s standards.
Results indicated that socially anxious subjects displayed a pattern of higher
socially prescribed perfectionism and lower social self-efficacy. In comparison with the
control and mildly depressed subjects, the socially anxious subjects exhibited a larger
discrepancy between social self-efficacy and perceived other‟s standards. This pattern of
results is consistent with the predictions of Clark and Wells‟ (1995) model of social
anxiety, which emphasizes the function of discrepancies between standards and perceived
ability to meet these standards in producing anxious responses. Of particular importance
is the study‟s specification of public standards as the key focus of anxiety, which coheres
with Clark and Wells‟ (1995) focus on impression management as the central goal of the
self-regulation process as well as the previously reviewed body of empirical research
linking public self-consciousness and other-focused behavioral standards to social
anxiety (Pilkonis, 1977; Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes; 1978; Wallace & Alden,
1991).
Alden, Bieling, and Wallace‟s (1994) research supports Clark and Wells‟ (1995)
model of social anxiety on several levels. First, it provides an empirical quantification of
the hypothesized comparison between standards and reference values, producing results
that closely match the model‟s predictions (Clark & Wells, 1995). Next, the observation
that socially anxious individuals seem to differ from the non-anxious in their
interpretation of the feasibility of meeting standards rather than the objective magnitude
of the standards themselves provide yet another source of support for Clark and Wells‟
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(1995) assertion that subjective biases are of paramount importance in conceptualizing
social anxiety.
Negative assumptions. Clark and Wells (1995) hypothesize that individuals who
experience high levels of anxiety are distinguished by particular assumptions regarding
their behavior in social situations. Specifically, such individuals may typically believe
that they are at risk of behaving in a manner that will be deemed socially unacceptable by
others and that this behavior will result in highly undesirable consequences. These
beliefs, in combination with a reference value that places a strong emphasis on conveying
a favorable impression when interacting with others, should further increase the
likelihood that an unfavorable discrepancy will be perceived during a social situation,
leading to negative affect and a persistent experience of anxiety. Indeed, many highly
anxious individuals report a great deal of anxiety even when anticipating a social
encounter that is relatively far in the future, indicating that these individuals actively
anticipate an unfavorable discrepancy based on little more than their assumptions and
expectations and further expect that this event will have pronounced negative
consequences.
This aspect of the Clark and Wells (1995) model of social anxiety suggests that in
comparison to non-anxious or less-anxious individuals, highly anxious individuals will
feel more threatened by the possibility that others may evaluate them negatively.
Empirical research has largely indicated that this is the case. Much of this research has
employed the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969), a
measure of cognitively-based fears of the disapproval of others. Stopa and Clark (1993)
administered the FNE to socially anxious individuals, non-anxious controls, and
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individuals with non-socially focused anxiety disorders following an experimental
interaction task. Of the three groups, socially anxious individuals reported the most
negative evaluation fears, consistent with what would be expected based on Clark and
Wells (1995). However, the authors also noted that the non-socially anxious group scored
more highly on the measure than did the non-anxious controls, suggesting that the scale
measures some features of anxious pathology which are not entirely unique to social
anxiety.
Rapee and Lim (1992) conducted a study in which socially phobic individuals and
non-phobic controls gave an impromptu speech before a small audience of raters, who
evaluated each subject‟s performance and appearance of anxiety using a variety of global
and specific criteria. Participants also provided ratings of their own speech performance
and anxiety experience. Consistent with other research (Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003; Stopa
& Clark, 1993), results indicated that participants with social phobia exhibited a
significant tendency to under-rate their own performance in comparison to the ratings of
others. The authors found that scores on the FNE were the only significant predictor of
this self-other discrepancy, further supporting the notion that expectations of negative
evaluation constitute a key determinant of social anxiety.
In an investigation of the effects of communication apprehension in classroom
settings, Booth-Butterfield (1989) conducted an experiment in which high and lowapprehensive undergraduate students were asked to imagine that they had recently given
a classroom speech for which they had prepared “reasonably well” and instructed to
complete a standardized performance feedback form to reflect how they believed their
instructor would evaluate them on such a speech, as well as providing an open-ended
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interpretation of what that feedback would signify about their performance. Results
indicated that both high and low-communication apprehensive individuals appeared to
generate their evaluations using similar criteria (e.g. content, quality of delivery, amount
of personal warmth), suggesting that communication apprehension did not fundamentally
alter the categories that students perceived to be the components of an effective speech.
However, high-apprehensive students estimated that they would be evaluated more
negatively than did their low apprehensive peers on the delivery and performance aspects
of the task, and endorsed more negative attributions in regards to the effectiveness of
their speaking. Interestingly, results also indicated that high-apprehensive individuals
evaluated themselves more positively on factors relating to speech content, an unexpected
finding that led the researcher to hypothesize that high-apprehensive individuals may
habitually put more effort into preparing the content of speeches in order to compensate
for their perceived difficulties in delivery factors.
In conjunction with the assertion that socially anxious individuals are more
concerned with being negatively evaluated by others, Clark and Wells‟ (1995) model also
theorizes that such individuals are more inclined to view their own social performance in
a negative light. Stopa and Clark (1993) evaluated the self-reported cognitions of socially
anxious individuals, non-anxious controls, and individuals with non socially-related
anxiety disorders following a social interaction task. Relative to the other two groups,
socially anxious subjects were significantly more likely to report having negative
thoughts about their own performance on the task. Cacioppo, Glass, and Merluzzi (1979)
performed a similar experiment in which socially anxious and non-anxious undergraduate
males were asked to list their thoughts while awaiting a brief interaction with a female.
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The socially anxious participants listed significantly more negative thoughts regarding
their anticipated performance. Furthermore, independent judges rated the reported
thoughts of the anxious participants as significantly different from those of the nonanxious participants, suggesting that socially anxious functioning is characterized by
distinctive patterns of cognition.
Other empirical studies have also broadly supported Clark and Wells‟ (1995)
conceptualization of socially anxious individuals holding lower expectations of their own
social performance abilities. The previously discussed findings of Rapee and Lim (1992)
that anxious individuals were more likely than controls to under-rate their performance
relative to the ratings of the objective observers indicates that in addition to greater fears
of negative evaluation, the socially anxious may tend to believe that performance
deficiencies in social situations will cause these fears to be realized. Stopa and Clark
(1993) observed a similar result, in which socially phobic participants were more strongly
negative than third-party observers in rating their social performance. In their study of
self-focused attention, Woody and Rodriguez (2000) found that socially phobic
individuals rated their performances as less skillful than did participants in a non-phobic
comparison group; however, objective raters in this case did not differ significantly from
the self-ratings of the social phobics. Rather, a self-other discrepancy was observed in the
non-phobic controls; the objective raters evaluated this group‟s performance significantly
lower than self-ratings, suggesting a potential bias toward overestimation of performance
efficacy in “normal” individuals.
Although individuals with social phobia have been described in the literature as
displaying social performance deficits (i.e. Alden & Wallace, 1995; Stopa & Clark,
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1993), the fact that the highly anxious often view themselves even more negatively than
objective observers serves to highlight the operation of significant negative biases.
Furthermore, the widely reported existence of this discrepancy in the highly anxious
indicates that a biased perspective on one‟s performance can drastically affect how a
social encounter is approached. These observations, coupled with the previously
reviewed research regarding the functioning of negative self-statements in social anxiety
(Harrell, Chambless, & Calhoun, 1981; Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, &
Becker, 1990; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg,
1993), fit well with the framework outlined by Clark and Wells (1995), which theorizes
that negative performance expectations serve to accentuate the disparity between
reference values and social performance as currently perceived.
Self-focused attention. Consistent with the literature reviewed previously
(Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Melchior & Cheek, 1990; Monfries & Kafer, 1994;
Pilkonis, 1977; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), Clark and Wells‟ (1995)
model of social anxiety outlines a central role for self-focused attention in provoking
anxious responding. Specifically, the model hypothesizes that once highly anxious
individuals enter a social situation in which a risk of negative evaluation is perceived,
they focus a large proportion of their attentional resources on themselves. Clark and
Wells (1995) theorize that self-focus serves to create an internal, cognitively-based
estimation of the individual‟s current social performance as seen by others in the
situation, roughly equivalent to Carver and Scheier‟s (1981) conceptualization of public
self-consciousness. This mental image is thought to function as the primary source of
performance feedback to be comparison with the active reference value. Since this
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conceptualization of the social self is heavily influenced by the individual‟s pre-existing
beliefs about his or her efficacy in social situations, highly anxious individuals, who tend
to express lower social self-efficacy (Stopa & Clark, 1993; Wallace & Alden, 1991), will
be more likely to perceive an unfavorable discrepancy from the outset of the social
encounter.
This hypothesized mechanism for the relationship between self-focused attention
and social anxiety finds some empirical support in Alden, Bieling, and Wallace‟s (1994)
study of the influence of perfectionistic thinking in social anxiety. Their results indicated
that frequency of self-appraisal during the interaction task was the most significant
predictor of the socially prescribed perfectionism that constitutes a key component of
social anxiety. Since the process of self-appraisal involves both self-focus and
comparison processes, the construct seems to be a reasonable approximation of Clark and
Wells‟ (1995) description of a social comparison process that becomes increasingly
engaged with self-focus. Therefore, the finding that self-appraisal is associated with
social anxiety seems quite consistent with this aspect of the Clark and Wells (1995)
model.
Safety behaviors. Clark and Wells (1995) also theorize that behavioral aspects
play a significant role in the course of social anxiety related self-regulation. Anxious
individuals are thought to engage in specific preventative defensive behaviors that are
inhibitory in nature, to attempt to guard against negative evaluation. The hypothesized
function of these “safety behaviors” is to prevent the individual from doing something
that he or she thinks is very likely to result in a negative evaluation, such as stammering
or turning red. Although safety behaviors are a form of anxiety regulation, Clark and
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Wells (1995) note that they are frequently counterproductive in actually reducing or
eliminating social or performance anxiety. Primarily, this is because the individual‟s
belief in the efficacy of safety behaviors in minimizing negative evaluation is thought to
prevent the individual from receiving feedback indicating that the feared event is actually
not as negatively evaluated by others as previously assumed. Another problem arises
when increased vigilance toward the feared outcomes that the safety behaviors attempt to
guard against causes those behaviors to become more likely to occur due to enhanced
sensitivity. Clark and Wells (1995) note that this latter situation is particularly common
when dealing with physiological processes such as trembling or blushing.
In an investigation of the effects of safety behaviors in interpersonal functioning,
Alden and Bieling (1998) subjected socially anxious and non-anxious undergraduate
women to a social interaction task with an experimental confederate. Prior to the
interaction, each participant was given one of two instructional briefings; which
suggested that the participant was likely to be positively appraised or negatively
appraised, respectively, by the interaction partner. Subjects rated their own performance
and anxiety during the interaction and completed measures reflecting their social goals
and level of physiological arousal. In addition, the participants were rated by the
interaction partner on the dimensions of likeability and appropriateness of responses
during the interaction, and participant responses were timed for length and rated for level
of intimacy by trained judges.
Results indicated that the socially anxious individuals in the negative appraisal
condition were significantly more likely to speak briefly and select low-intimacy topics
of conversation than socially anxious individuals in the positive appraisal condition,
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despite the fact that no significant differences in physiological arousal were found
between the two socially anxious groups. The observed situational variance of the use of
low self-disclosure and brief response strategies by socially anxious individuals indicates
that they were utilized as safety behaviors to guard against negative evaluation, consistent
with the characterization of Clark and Wells (1995). Additionally, the researchers found
that socially anxious subjects in the negative appraisal condition who engaged in the
aforementioned safety behaviors were rated as less likable by partners than socially
anxious subjects in the positive appraisal condition who did not. This latter finding could
not be accounted for by levels of anxiety, which did not vary between conditions for the
anxious subjects, suggesting that the behaviors themselves caused the negative
evaluations. This interpretation provides an important measure of empirical support for
Clark and Wells‟ (1995) claims for the counter productiveness of safety behaviors in
preventing others‟ negative evaluations in social situations.
Voncken, Alden, and Bögels (2006) conducted a novel investigation of the
consequences of engaging in safety behaviors by presenting subjects with a series of
vignettes in which a character experiences anxiety in a social situation and asking them to
rate how well that character would be perceived by the interaction partner in that situation
and how they would be perceived were they to behave as the character did in that
situation. Three different versions of the vignette were presented: one in which the
character acknowledges his or her anxiety, one in which the character engages in safety
behaviors to conceal his or her anxiety, and one in which the character neither
acknowledges nor conceals his or her anxiety. Participants indicated that engaging in
safety behaviors to conceal social anxiety would likely result in more negative outcomes
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than either acknowledging or not responding to anxiety. This prediction was made by
participants who scored highly on a measure of social anxiety as well as those who did
not, indicating that the socially anxious may be as aware of the negative consequences of
safety behaviors than those who do not suffer from social anxiety. However, in line with
research suggesting that socially anxious individuals expect disproportionately negative
outcomes for themselves in social situations (Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993;
Wallace & Alden, 1991), the socially anxious participants in the study estimated that they
would be perceived more negatively for engaging in the safety behaviors described in the
vignette as compared to their estimations of how the character would be perceived, while
non-socially anxious individuals did not.
Working from a communication studies perspective, Burgoon and LePoire (1993)
examined the influence of expectancies and behavior on perceptions of conversation
partners by asking undergraduate participates to interact with a confederate who had been
instructed to engage in nonverbal behaviors denoting either a warm and open or a restless
and disengaged manner. Prior to the interaction, the experimenters induced positive or
negative expectancies in the participants by presenting them with a list of personal
attribute ratings ostensibly completed by the confederate indicating either positive traits
such as maturity and responsibility or negative traits such as arrogance and selfcenteredness, and augmenting this with a verbal statement that based on recent
observations, the confederate should be either difficult or easy to work with. Results
indicated a strong main effect for communication type, whereby the open and warm
communicators were judged as being more positive, effective, and rewarding than the
closed and disengaged communicators. The negative effect of the closed style of
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nonverbal communication persisted even in instances when positive expectancies were
induced beforehand, leading the researchers to conclude that observed communication
behaviors can result in evaluations by others that run counter to previously held
expectations. Although this research did not directly measure social anxiety or
communication apprehension elements at the construct level, the “negative” nonverbal
behaviors employed by the researchers are strikingly reminiscent of some of the safety
behaviors described by Clark and Wells (1995), and the findings regarding the
unfavorable effects of this style reinforce the contention that behavioral correlates of
social anxiety increase the likelihood of undesirable evaluations by others.
Daly, Vangelisti, and Weber (1995) conducted an empirical investigation into the
speech preparation strategies of anxious individuals compared to their non-anxious
counterparts. Hypothesizing that speech anxiety exerts a detrimental effect on the
preparation elements of public speaking, the author instructed undergraduate participants
to plan an impromptu speech by verbalizing their speaking strategy into a recorder in a
“think-aloud” manner during the preparation period. The participants then delivered their
speech to an audience of trained raters. The recordings of their preparations were
analyzed by trained raters and their verbal content was divided into distinct units
reflecting previously identified aspects of preparation such as presentation concerns,
speech organization, phrasing, expressions of nervousness, and others. Results indicated
that higher scores on a self-report measure of speaking anxiety predicted lower
performance ratings on the speech itself. Furthermore, increases in speaking anxiety
predicted less time devoted to planning critical presentation factors, such as adapting the
speech to the audience and planning to fully utilize equipment such as visual aids and
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more time devoted to coming up with information to include in the speech and worrying
about capabilities as a speaker. The researchers note that all of the responses associated
with speaking anxiety are likely to diminish one‟s capacity to be an effective presenter,
and theorize that they are the main contributors to the observed lower performance
ratings associated with public speaking anxiety. The conclusion that speech anxiety
influences sufferers to focus less on preparing and executing effective presentation
strategies and more on self-doubts and specific content concerns is highly compatible
with Clark and Wells‟ (1995) conceptualization of safety behavior, and indicates that
avoiding preparations to relate more directly to the audience may be a safety behavior
that is unique to public speaking anxiety.
Attentional biases in external feedback. Clark and Wells (1995) state that as the
dominant standard for comparison against the reference value, the mental image of the
social self is subject to revision over the course of the social encounter. As per the
dynamic nature of self-regulation, these feedback channels can take a variety of forms,
including internal experiences and external signifiers produced by other individuals in the
encounter. Clark and Wells (1995) theorize that for socially anxious individuals, the
feedback process is impacted by the negative biases and tendencies toward self-focused
attention that are commonly observed in anxious functioning. First, self-focused attention
causes the socially anxious to be far less vigilant to external feedback in general, due to
the finite amount of attentional resources available at any given time. Secondly, the
tendency toward negative self-perceptions regarding social performance in such
individuals decreases the likelihood that any external feedback that is observed will be
interpreted as reflecting a favorable or acceptable performance. This is due largely to the
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fact that the majority of feedback cues from others in social situations are nonverbal or
otherwise ambiguous, particularly in public speaking scenarios, where the speaker
typically receives no verbal feedback for the entire duration of the speaking encounter.
As a result, Clark and Wells (1995) theorize that the individual‟s experiences of these
feedback cues are heavily influenced by prevailing negative biases in information
processing. These biases are thought to actively maintain the anxiety producing
discrepancy between reference values and perceived performance by blocking the
availability of positive external feedback, which, if recognized, would reduce both the
discrepancy and the associated anxiety.
A meta-analytic study of 172 studies regarding attentional bias in anxiety by BarHaim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenberg, and van Ijzendoorn (2007) found a
significant threat-related bias in anxious subjects that was not present in non-anxious
subjects. Interestingly, this bias was exhibited in both conscious and non-conscious
processing tasks, indicating that enhanced threat detection in anxious individuals is likely
attributable to both automatic processes, such as shifts in attention, and elaborative
processes, such as active consideration of multiple factors to determine whether a threat
is present. In another interesting result, findings indicated that the magnitude of the
threat-related bias was similar across all the varieties of anxiety disorder included in the
study, which included such diverse syndromes as generalized anxiety disorder,
posttraumatic stress disorder, and simple phobia in addition to social phobia. Also, the
threat-related bias was found to be similar between clinically anxious individuals and
high-anxious individuals not meeting clinical criteria for an anxiety disorder. The authors
theorize that the latter two findings may be indicative of a broad common component to
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all the anxiety disorders which involves threat-related attentional biases. This
interpretation is consistent with the predictions of cognitive theory (Beck, Emery, &
Greenberg, 1985; Beck & Clark, 1997) as well as the specific social anxiety model of
Clark and Wells (1995).
Winton, Clark, and Edelmann (1995) conducted a different empirical
investigation into attentional biases in the socially anxious by examining whether or not
social anxiety leads to an increased ability to detect negative emotion in others. The
authors exposed individuals reporting either high or low amounts of negative evaluation
fears to a pair of experimental tasks involving identification of negative versus neutral
affect on faces presented both pictorially and verbally. After an initial exposure to this
task, subjects were told that they may be required to give a short speech in front of an
audience as part of their participation. This was done as a means of experimentally
manipulating social threat. Following the manipulation, the participants repeated the
tasks. Results indicated that the social threat manipulation was not found to be effective
in altering task responses in either group of participants. However, it was found that
subjects who reported more negative evaluation fears were more accurate than their
counterparts in identifying negative affect from the cues presented in the experimental
tasks. However, they were found to be less accurate at identifying neutral affect. The
authors interpreted this pattern of results as indicating that the increased sensitivity to
negative affect may be the result of a general negative response bias in individuals with
negative evaluation fears rather than an objective increase in ability to interpret social
cues.
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Importance of subjective internal experience. As was alluded to in the above
discussion of feedback interpretation, the Clark and Wells (1995) model of social anxiety
stresses the importance of the idiographic beliefs and perceptions of the anxious
individual in determining behavior. In many cases, the anxious individual‟s perceptions
of his or her social self-efficacy and the likelihood and consequences of negative
evaluation are grossly exaggerated. Likewise, the tendency of anxious individuals to infer
negative evaluations from ambiguous feedback cues during the social situation often has
little more than a tenuous basis in objectively verifiable fact. Despite this, the individual‟s
subjective interpretation of the situation remains the crucial concern in determining his or
her anxiety responses to a social situation. This idea is reflected in nearly every aspect of
the Clark and Wells (1995) model, particularly the designation of the mental image of the
social self as the standard of comparison to the reference value. At its core, the central
process of comparison outlined in the model is between two subjective and internallygenerated values; the reference value and the self-perceived estimate of current
performance. Moreover, both of these values are greatly influenced by subjective, intraindividual biases and relatively resistant to disconfirming information from external
sources. In the case of highly anxious individuals, such biases skew the self-regulation
system to the point where the development of a discrepancy between current estimation
of performance and the reference value for performance is virtually assured. The model‟s
authors note that the highly subjective nature of this process is typically not recognized
by anxiety sufferers, who often uncritically accept their perceptions due to the strength of
their affective experiences during anxiety-provoking social situations.
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One of the more intriguing sources of empirical support for the influence of
subjective internal experiences in social and performance anxiety can be found in the
literature outlining the “illusion of transparency” (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998).
The phrase “illusion of transparency” describes a situation in which an individual
believes that his or her internal emotional or cognitive experiences are apparent to
observers when in fact these experiences are largely unavailable to others and may exert
only a slight effect on their judgment of the individual. This bias is thought to operate
when particularly strong internal experiences lead the affected individual to assume that
corresponding external indicators exist and are readily perceivable.
Although the illusion of transparency was initially demonstrated on behaviors
within the range of normal experience, such as overestimating the ability of others to
detect lies, nonverbal expressions of disgust, and concern over unethical behavior
(Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998), the paradigm was applied to speaking anxiety by
Savitsky and Gilovich (2003), who instructed pairs of participants to give impromptu
speeches before an audience. Each participant was asked to provide ratings of how
anxious he or she believed to have appeared during the speech and how anxious the other
participant appeared. Results indicated that participants rated themselves as having
appeared more nervous than their counterpart had rated them as appearing, supporting the
operation of an illusion of transparency effect. The authors also demonstrated an
intriguing effect whereupon participants who were informed of the effect prior to
speaking rated themselves more positively, expected to be rated more positively by
observers, and were actually rated more highly by said observers, indicating that the
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effects of the illusion of transparency bias in speaking anxiety are amenable to
intervention (Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003).
The success of Savitsky and Gilovich (2003) in empirically documenting the
operation of an illusion of transparency bias in public speaking anxiety also provides
support for the Clark and Wells (1995) social anxiety model. The finding that individuals
in a public speaking situation frequently over-estimate how anxious they appear to
observers reflects the above mentioned model‟s assertion that anxious responding is
heavily influenced by internal and subjective factors. Furthermore, the illusion of
transparency theory‟s premise that susceptibility is dependent on the intensity of the
internal experience matches well with Clark and Wells‟ (1995) emphasis on the role of
self-focus and interoceptive cues in producing socially anxious responding. Although the
illusion of transparency is a general tendency and not thought to be specific to anxious
populations, the magnitude of the over-estimation and the corresponding behavioral
effects will in all likelihood be greater in the highly anxious due to the intense and
aversive nature of anxiety experiences. Finally, Savitsky and Gilovich‟s (2003)
demonstration of the positive effects of informing subjects about the illusion of
transparency bias before a speech seems to fit coherently with Clark and Wells‟ (1995)
account of the influence of available feedback sources in increasing or decreasing social
and performance anxiety.
Further evidence for the importance of subjective interpretations of internal
experiences in speaking anxiety comes from an experimental study conducted by Beatty
and Behnke (1991). Working from a communication apprehension paradigm, these
researchers examined the heart rate responses of both high-apprehensive and low-
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apprehensive individuals during two different public speaking tasks. One of these was
constructed to be a low-intensity speaking task, in which the participants spoke in front of
a single audience member and were informed that their data would be used only for
experimental purposes, and the other, in which participants spoke in front of a classroom
of 15-20 undergraduates and were informed that their speech would be evaluated by all
present and the results forwarded to their public speaking instructors for a course grade,
was constructed to be a high-intensity task. Results indicated that during the low-intensity
task, the high-apprehensive speakers had significantly higher heart rates than their lowapprehensive counterparts. However, during the high-intensity task, no statistically
significant difference in heart rate between high and low-apprehensive speakers was
noted, yet the high-apprehensive speakers reported significantly more anxiety than did
the low-apprehensives on this task.
Beatty and Behnke (1991) interpreted this aspect of their findings as illustrative
of the primacy of non-physiological factors, such as differences in cognitive
interpretations of somatic experiences, in promoting speech-anxious responding. In
discussing this point, the authors note that effective speakers who enjoy the process of
public speaking may also experience increased physiological arousal in the form of
enthusiasm or excitement, and suggest that further attention be paid to the more
subjective elements that bias speaking experiences in one direction or the other. Their
discussion again underscores the importance of identifying and empirically studying the
characteristic patterns of experience that differentiate speech-anxious from non-anxious
individuals, as well as tacitly acknowledging the role of these elements in measuring and
diagnosis speaking anxiety in common settings.
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Cognitive Assessment Methods and Social Anxiety Assessment
Capitalizing on advances in the theoretical and empirical literature on social
anxiety, assessment techniques have begun moving toward more specific and externally
valid methods of empirically measuring social anxiety. As addressed above, modern
conceptualizations (e.g. Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Ingram
& Kendall, 1987; Stopa & Clark, 1993) stress the influence of cognitions and other
subjective factors on socially anxious behavior. In order to incorporate these difficult to
quantify constructs into standardized assessments, researchers have pioneered a variety of
techniques. Of these, research attention has focused especially on a family of methods
known alternatively as thought-listing or cognitive self-statement assessment. As
described by Cacioppo, von Hippel, and Ernst (1997), thought-listing is a naturalistic
method for assessing cognitive structures in which an individual simply makes a list of
his or her thoughts while in a specific situation. Glass and Arnkoff (1997) note that
measures based on such methods lend the potential advantage of being able to identify
specific patterns of cognitions associated with certain disorders or pathologies. The key
features of thought-listing methodologies, along with relevant strengths and weaknesses,
are discussed below.
Cognitions as surface measures. Self-statements, or thoughts in which individuals
evaluate some feature of their self-image or current behavior, are the crucial cognitive
feature assessed in thought-listing (Glass & Arnkoff, 1997). Thought-listing methods
seek to make the most accurate possible measure of cognitions as they are experienced
within the stream of consciousness. Therefore, most thought-listing methods place great
emphasis on individuals reporting their thoughts shortly after they are experienced. This
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focus on veridical reporting is undergirded by the theory that such surface-level, “in the
moment” cognitions, if measured, will exhibit distinct themes or patterns which will
allow for distinctions between groups of interest (Clark, 1988). Cacioppo, von Hippel,
and Ernst (1997) highlight the fact that the thought-listing technique does not require
subjects to be aware of or provide any insight into the motivations or causal mechanisms
that underlie their thoughts. The importance of these features is that they give the
thought-listing technique a distinctly empirical bent, with a focus on determining whether
or not specific and identifiable thoughts or patterns of thoughts are associated with
specific and identifiable behaviors.
Methods of thought-sampling. The process of quantifying self-statements, often
referred to in the literature as “thought sampling,” can take several forms (Clark, 1988;
Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997; Heimberg, 1994). Of these flavors of
cognitive self-statement assessment, the most frequently used are the endorsement and
production methods. As described by Glass and Arnkoff (1997), endorsement methods
involve presenting subjects with a list of potentially experienced thoughts and asking
them to indicate whether each thought was experienced or how often the thought was
experienced during the situation of interest. The authors note that such methods are
popular because they allow for the creation of assessments that are easy to administer and
score while possessing a high degree of structure. Additionally, such structured measures
can be used to take a more deliberate and focused approach to the assessment of
positively and negatively valenced thoughts, which can result in a more comprehensive
picture of the cognitive features associated with the situation of interest. In a review of
cognitive assessment measures, Clark (1988) noted that the endorsement-based measures
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have the strongest degree of experimental support for their ability to make valid
distinctions between groups and their sensitivity to treatment effects. These advantages
have made the endorsement approach the most popular for self-statement assessment
(Glass & Arnkoff, 1994).
Glass and Arnkoff (1997) also note several disadvantages of endorsement
methods. The most crucial of these is the observation that the included statements may or
may not reflect the individual‟s actual thoughts. Should endorsement items fail reflect
cognitive products relevant to the individual‟s experience, the validity of the thoughtsampling as a whole will be subsequently compromised (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994). An
additional weakness of endorsement measures is the possibility that the structured nature
of these assessments may result in increased demand characteristics or reappraisals of
thoughts after the fact, both of which represent significant threats to validity (Clark,
1988; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997). Additionally, although the summary scores that are
typically produced by assessments that utilize endorsement measures are useful for
normative purposes, they may be overly reductionistic in representing the individual‟s
cognitive features as compared to less structured methods.
A second variety of cognitive self-statement assessment involves individuals
making a verbal or written self-report of their thoughts. These methods, which are termed
production methods (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994), conform fairly closely to the variant of the
thought-listing method described by Cacioppo, von Hippel, and Ernst (1997). Production
methods enjoy some advantages in comparison to endorsement methods. Foremost
among these is the avoidance of potential demand characteristics involved with
endorsement methods due to the fact that production methods do not prompt participants
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with specific thoughts that may have occurred in the situation (Heimberg, 1994).
Cacioppo, von Hippel, and Ernst (1997) also cite the utility of production methods in
situations where hypotheses about the relevant cognitive dimensions to be investigated
are relatively unformed, necessitating a more exploratory tack for the research. Arnkoff
and Glass (1989) report that the thought-listing method in particular has shown a great
degree of versatility as a measure of cognitions in social anxiety research, generally
displaying excellent inter-rater reliability and good construct validity, while offering a
richer vein of information than is usually produced by endorsement measures.
However, the production method also has some notable limitations. The first of
these is the possibility that individuals may deliberately misreport their thoughts for
social desirability reasons or that biases in processing or memory may influence the
process of reporting thoughts, both of which may be difficult to consistently control for in
research (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997). Additionally, in his review of cognitive
assessments, Clark (1988) reported that the ability of production measures to distinguish
between high and low-anxious subjects has varied from study to study, suggesting that
the validity of such measures may vary depending on factors such as the specific variety
of anxiety being assessed and the method of judging employed to rate the collected selfstatements. Finally, Glass and Furlong (1990) found that the Social Interaction SelfStatement Test (SISST; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982), an endorsement
measure of social anxiety, displayed stronger correlations with measures of social
anxiety-related beliefs, concerns, and behaviors than did a thought-listing measure when
both were administered after an interaction task. The authors interpreted this finding as an
indication that the unstructured nature of production methods may suffer from power and
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specificity issues in comparison to psychometrically sound endorsement measures (Glass
& Furlong, 1990).
Situational exposure. One of the key features of cognitive assessment is the
emphasis placed on identifying thoughts within the context of the specific situations in
which they occur. This focus on specificity can be traced back to the influence of
cognitive theory (Beck, 1976; Ingram & Kendall, 1987), which explicitly outlines
connections between specific cognitions, contexts, and behaviors. In order to ensure the
most valid association between measured cognitions and the behaviors and situations of
interest, the majority of social anxiety studies utilizing such measures expose participants
to an experimentally-controlled analog of the situation of interest, such as an unstructured
conversation (Alden, Bieling, & Wallace, 1994; Glass & Furlong, 1990; Wallace &
Alden, 1991) or public speech (Rodebaugh & Rapee, 2005; Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003;
Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000). A prototypical example of this practice is
described by Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, and Larsen (1982) in their account of the
development of the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST), a self-statement
measure of anxiety during heterosocial (opposite-sex) interaction situations. The items on
the SISST were generated by asking undergraduate subjects to imagine themselves in
specific heterosocial interaction situations and record thoughts they would likely
experience in that situation. After the item generation process, the researchers tested the
validity of the resultant measure by giving it to high and low socially anxious subjects
following a 3-minute interaction task with an opposite-sex confederate, finding that the
SISST was successfully able to discriminate between the two groups.
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The use of situational exposure in cognitive self-statement assessment aids
researchers in acquiring valid measures of the cognitions of interest (Glass & Arnkoff,
1994). Cacioppo, von Hippel and Ernst (1997) outline several methodological aspects
which can serve to broaden the likelihood of maximizing such validity. The most
important of these is limiting the amount of time that elapses between the exposure
situation and the assessment of thoughts. This reduces the likelihood that memory biases
or forgetfulness will cause the recorded thoughts to markedly differ from those that are
experienced in the stream of consciousness. A second important concern is attempting to
ensure that the experimental situation corresponds to an external situation that is likely to
produce anxiety for the subjects. By manipulating certain features of the situation, such
as having participants interact with an attractive member of the opposite sex or stressing
that a speech will be evaluated by judges, the power of the situations to promote anxiety
can be increased, with subsequent benefits for validity (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst,
1997).
Judging issues. Whether self-statements are collected by production or
endorsement methods, it is the task of researchers to designate how these statements are
to be evaluated. In many cases, this is done by trained judges, who provide independent
ratings according to criteria provided by the researchers. However, within the empirical
literature, there has been a great amount of variance observed both in the criteria on
which thoughts are rated and the methods used to rate them. To address the latter issue,
Tarico, Van Velzen, and Altmaier (1986) compared three commonly used rating methods
to evaluate thoughts generated by a public speaking situation: subject self-rating, rating
by experts with thoughts presented in the order in which they were originally generated,
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and rating by experts with thoughts presented in random order. The researchers found
high inter-rater reliability between the three groups and strong predictive validity for all
three methods for public speaking anxiety as measured by the Personal Report of
Confidence as a Speaker (Paul, 1966). Interpreting these results as suggestive of a
general equivalency between methods in terms of validity and reliability, the authors
recommended that rating method for evaluation of thoughts be selected by weighing the
expenditure of time and resources needed to employ trained raters against the potential
that such trained raters might display better judgment in instances where the evaluation
criteria require a greater degree of inference.
Valence scoring. The most commonly applied rating criteria in self-statement
assessments, particularly in social anxiety research, is the emotional valence of thoughts.
Cacioppo, von Hippel, and Ernst (1997) discuss the practice of evaluating listed thoughts
for positive or negative emotionality, noting that various methods have been employed to
do so, including simple frequency counts and more elaborate indices incorporating ratios.
This topic was given a more thorough empirical treatment by Amsel and Fichten (1990),
who compared raw-frequency scoring methods on a self-statement assessment to two
different ratio scores, one representing the proportion of positive to negative thoughts and
the other representing the proportion of positive thoughts to the combined total of
positive and negative thoughts. Results indicated that the latter ratio score, known as the
States-of-Mind ratio (SOM; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986), with a slight correction
applied in cases in which the subject reports either no positive or negative thoughts, was
generally the most suitable statistic, due to this ratio‟s ability to both accurately represent
the data and provide a common metric for comparison across studies. Furthermore,
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positive thoughts were more frequently reported than negative thoughts, and that positive
and negative thoughts were found to be functionally independent, rather than representing
opposite ends of a continuum (Amsel & Ficten, 1990).
This characterization of positive and negative affect as distinct systems mirrors
the predictions and observations of self-regulation theorists (Carver & Scheier, 1981;
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Carver, 2006). Many social anxiety researchers (e.g. Cacioppo,
von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Heimberg, 1994) have also
conceptualized affect in this manner. Glass and Arnkoff (1994) favorably evaluated the
validity of the SOM ratio in assessing self-statements in social phobia, particularly in the
areas of representativeness and convergent validity with self-report measures. When
these results are taken in concert with the wealth of evidence in the empirical literature
connecting negative affect with socially anxious functioning (Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa
& Clark, 1993; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), the utility of emotional valence as a focus of
self-statement evaluation in social anxiety assessment is quite well supported.
Attentional focus scoring. Despite the wide acceptance of emotional valence as a
key metric in evaluating social anxiety-relevant self-statements, investigators (e.g.
Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Clark, 1988; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997) have
increasingly begun to question whether simply evaluating the positivity or negativity of a
self-statement provides an adequate representation of that statement‟s relationship to
socially anxious behavior. As discussed above, theoretical and empirical work has led to
a conceptualization of socially anxious behavior that is considerably more nuanced than
mere distinction between positive and negative affect. To this end, theorists have
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increasingly emphasized the benefits of also evaluating attentional focus in cognitive
self-statement assessment.
The role of attention, especially self-focused attention, in socially anxious
behavior has been well-documented (Melchior & Cheek, 1990; Pilkonis, 1977; Pineles &
Mineka, 2005; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), suggesting that broadening
self-statement evaluation criteria to include such information might increase predictive
validity. In their investigation of self-statement scoring methods, Amsel and Fichten
(1990) evaluated for attentional focus as well as emotional valence, finding that
interactions of the two dimensions were endorsed at different frequencies, with selfrelated positive thoughts being more common than self-related negative thoughts, and
other-related negative thoughts being more common than other-related positive thoughts.
As a result, the SOM ratio scores when self-statements were grouped by attentional focus
were significantly different from when emotional valence was the only criteria employed,
revealing that subjects reported significantly more self-related than other-related
thoughts. Although the situation employed by Amsel and Fichten (1990) was not
specifically designed to measure social anxiety, there is strong support for the idea that
adding a focus of attention dimension to self-statement evaluation can capture additional
between-group variance useful in assessing social anxiety (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994).
Validity Issues in Cognitive Assessment
While cognitive assessment and thought-listing methods offer a robust strategy
for creating empirically-based assessments of group differences, the fundamental
intangibility of cognitions necessitates that great care be taken to ensure that validity be
preserved. To an even greater degree than with other methods, self-statement measures
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are subject to threats to psychometric soundness throughout the formulation process
(Glass & Arnkoff, 1994). As such, researchers have taken pains to survey the existing
literature on self-statement measures in order to identify relevant concerns and pitfalls to
be avoided.
Situational specificity. As previously discussed, Glass and Arnkoff (1994) note
that using an anxiety provoking situation to generate self-statements for use as potential
item measures can be problematic if the situation does not closely match the context in
which the assessment is designed to be employed. This is particularly important in social
anxiety assessment, as social situations take a variety of forms, with different features
potentially influencing the nature and amount of anxiety experienced. For instance, the
self-statements associated with anxiety in a public speaking situation may be qualitatively
different from those associated with anxiety in an interaction situation.
In a precursor to the current study, Beck, Marin, Huber, and Rodriguez (2005)
used a thought listing measure to collect self-statements about public speaking from a
sample of 35 undergraduate participants. In order to ensure that the collected cognitions
were as representative as possible to a real-world public speaking scenario, care was
taken to reconstruct the prototypical features of public speaking, such as the presence of
an audience, expectations of coherence and clarity in the verbal content of the speech,
and non-verbal behavioral elements such as having the subject stand and deliver his or
her speech while the audience sat passively. Participants in this study were explicitly
instructed to treat the speaking scenario as they would a speech in a real-world setting
such as a classroom. High correlations were found between participant self-reports of
anxiety on the experimental task and scores on the Personal Report of Confidence as a
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Speaker Scale (PRCS; Paul, 1966), suggesting that the task successfully elicited anxiety
from individuals who generally tend to be speech-anxious.
In their review of current issues in self-statement measures of social and
performance anxiety, Glass and Arnkoff (1994) express concerns about several
researchers employing the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST) to evaluate
public speaking anxiety-related cognitions, despite the fact that the measure was
developed to assess anxiety during interactions with the opposite-sex. The authors
caution that the SISST may lack content validity for public speaking anxiety, thereby
threatening the strength of results when this measure is used for such purposes. A variety
of authors commenting on the use of cognitive measures in social anxiety echo similar
concerns (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Clark, 1988; Heimberg, 1994),
recommending that such measures be used only in the specific situation for which they
were developed in order to maximize validity. In situations where a well-validated
cognitive measure is not available, researchers are encouraged to create and validate one
using empirically sound psychometric methods in lieu of substituting a less appropriate
test (Clark, 1988).
Criterion-related validity. A second critical concern in creating a cognitive
assessment measure of anxiety is ensuring that the items be of sufficient specificity and
sensitivity to distinguish between high and low-anxious individuals. Most of the
empirical support for self-statement measures in this area comes from the use of
contrasted groups, in which the responses of individuals previously known to suffer from
social and performance anxiety are contrasted with those of individuals who do not. Glass
and Arnkoff (1994) conclude that the literature on contrasted groups using the SISST and
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other measures generally supports the ability of self-statement measures to distinguish
between socially anxious and non-anxious individuals, particularly with frequency of
negative thoughts. The authors note that some problems exist with method variance in
terms of self-statement generation and rating, which may be responsible for the
conflicting study results regarding the factors that distinguish anxious from non-anxious
individuals. Additionally, they observed that current measures have been inconsistent in
their ability to distinguish between subtypes of social phobia and that such measures may,
in some cases, be confounded with the presence of depressive symptoms. This latter
remark lends another indication that self-statement measures of social anxiety processes
may greatly benefit from increased specificity through broadening validation samples to
include individuals with a variety of pathologies beyond social anxiety and validating
measures in connection with a variety of situations, both related and un-related to the
construct of interest (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994).
Measure reactivity. Glass and Arnkoff (1994) also consider the possibility that the
process of measuring self-statements might damage validity by confounding the subject‟s
experiences of anxiety or self-evaluation. Although reviewed studies indicate that the
thought-listing process by itself does not affect subject self-reports of anxiety or
estimated performance, reactivity may become a problem when subject responses to the
experimental social situation are conspicuously observed, such as when a judge or video
camera is present. These elements may increase the individual‟s sense that he or she is
being evaluated, resulting in elevated feelings of self-consciousness. Based on the results
of a study that found the presence of a video camera significantly altered subject
proportions of positive and negative thoughts on a thought-listing measure and the reports
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of other investigators that more surreptitious tactics such as hidden cameras or audiorecording eliminate this effect, Glass and Arnkoff (1994) recommended that researchers
be cognizant of the potential for reactivity when planning their investigations.
Sensitivity to change. A final concern in assessing the validity of a cognitive
measure of social anxiety is the ability of that measure to detect change. Given that
cognitive processes occupy a central role in theoretical conceptualizations of social
anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Stopa & Clark, 1993) and that
such processes are targeted for change in psychotherapy for these issues (Beck, Emery, &
Greenberg, 1985), valid change detection is clearly one of the most important functions
of cognitive measures of social anxiety. Heimberg (1994), in a review of empirical
studies on the change sensitivity of currently employed measures of social anxiety, noted
a relative paucity of data on cognitive self-statement measures. The majority of cited
research on endorsement measures of cognitions focused on the ability of the SISST to
assess change for pre to post-treatment in social phobics, which has largely been
supported. However, Heimberg cautions that all of the reviewed studies either made some
change to the measure or employed it in a situation other than the heterosocial
interactions that it was designed for, which may compromise validity.
Heimberg (1994) also reviewed studies that measured change using general
thought-listing production measures. Although there were again a small number of
investigations and substantial method variance in terms of cognition rating, a trend was
observed in which negative cognitions in social phobics were significantly reduced posttreatment, and some studies indicated that this effect was greater when cognitivebehavioral treatments were used. Despite these promising initial results, the author
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emphasized the limited scope of current studies of the ability of self-statement measures
to be sensitive to change and called for greater utilization of production and endorsement
cognitive measures in future research before stronger conclusions are able to be drawn. In
doing so, he entreats investigators to pay more attention to the role of information
processing in devising cognitive assessments, noting that despite a plethora of evidence
suggesting that socially anxious individuals display significant preferences for threatrelated cues, these and other processing characteristics have not been incorporated into
assessments in any meaningful way. Since thought process may be as, or more, important
as thought content in terms of being a target for change in social anxiety, such advances
in assessment could yield significant improvements in the efficacy of measures to assess
change.
The Current Study
The current study addresses a critical gap in social anxiety assessment by using
empirical methods to validate a self-statement measure of public speaking anxiety.
Currently, the most commonly used measures of public speaking anxiety suffer from a
variety of limitations. The majority (i.e. Paul, 1966; Watson & Friend, 1969) have not
been developed using empirical methodologies, and thus may contain items with
problematic content or poor criterion-related validity. Furthermore, the public speaking
anxiety measures that have been developed using empirical methods of self-statement
generation have significant problems. One (Hofmann & DiBartolo, 2000) uses selfstatement items that were not generated by a public speaking situation, calling the
specificity of the measure into question. Another (Cho, Smits, & Telch, 2004) assesses
only negative self-statements, which may be limiting when considering findings in the
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literature (Alden & Wallace, 1991; Carver, 2006; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Woody, 1996;
Woody & Rodriguez, 2000) that point to the potential benefits for considering
discriminant validity of assessing positive affect and adding a focus of attention
dimension.
In light of this situation, the research line that produced this study has undertaken
to develop a measure of public speaking anxiety with items that are derived from selfstatements generated by anxious and non-anxious individuals in an experimental public
speaking situation. Furthermore, these items have been rated for focus of attention as well
as emotional valence, with the expectation that incorporating this dimension will add
more power in differentiating high-anxious individuals. Additionally, the measure has
been designed for greater sensitivity to speaking anxiety as a dimensional construct by
using a five-point scale rather than a dichotomous response format.
Precursors to the Current Study
In attempting to generate a more empirically-derived measure of public speaking
anxiety, the current study builds upon previous research conducted specifically to provide
the proposed measure with a pool of empirically-generated items. This study and the
preceding investigations collectively form a multi-part effort to ensure that scale items
reflect the key validity criteria outlined above by Glass and Arnkoff (1994). The
methodology of each is briefly summarized below.
Collection of speaking-related cognitions. Beck, Huber, Marin, & Rodriguez
(2005) recruited 35 undergraduate participants at Southern Illinois University at
Carbondale to participate in the initial collection of speaking-related cognitions for this
project. All participants completed the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker
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(PRCS; Paul, 1966). Nineteen of these participants (54% of the sample) received a score
above 15 on the measure and were designated as high in public speaking anxiety based
on a median split, with the remaining 16 participants (46% of the sample) with scores of
14 or lower being designated as low in public speaking anxiety. Each participant was
asked to give a speech of roughly three minutes in length, on one of three topics
(“Describe life in Carbondale”, “describe what you did last summer”, or “describe your
favorite holiday”). All speeches were recorded on videotape, and participants were
informed that an audience of two individuals would be observing their speech through a
one-way mirror and rating their performance. This last manipulation was performed to
ensure that the participant would perceive himself or herself as a focus of evaluation
during the speaking situation; no audience was actually present on the other side of the
mirror. Participants were given a five-minute period to prepare their thoughts before the
speech. At the end of this period, each participant was given a thought-listing form and
asked to write down all of the thoughts they could recall having in the previous five
minutes. Additionally, each participant provided estimations on a 0-100 Subjective Units
of Distress (SUDS; Wolpe, 1969) scale of how anxious he or she expected to feel during
the task and how well he or she expected to perform on the speech. Upon completion of
the speech, participants were asked list their thoughts during the speech itself on a second
form and to rate their anxiety experiences and speech performance on the same scale on
which they had previously made their estimations. Finally, participants completed the
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), and a short demographic
measure.

66
Conversion of self-statements into potential measure items. After collecting a pool
of cognitive self-statements in the aforementioned manner, two trained raters evaluated
each thought for both affective valence (positive, negative, or neutral) and focus of
attention (self-focused, other-focused, or undifferentiated) using standardized guidelines
created especially for the study. Following the rating process, the self-statements were
assessed for their potential to serve as measure items. In order to ensure that the selected
self-statements were those that were best able to positively differentiate speech-anxious
from non-anxious subjects, a variety of factors were considered in this process. First,
given the empirical findings that negative, self-focused cognitions are most often
associated with anxiety, self-statements rated as meeting this criterion were considered to
be more discriminating. Secondly, self-statements generated by individuals who scored
highly on the PRCS and reported more anxiety about the speaking task were considered
more discriminating than those generated by individuals with lower PRCS scores and less
self-reported anxiety. Finally, self-statements which were similar to those made by other
participants were judged to be more reliable correlates of speaking anxiety than selfstatements which were less commonly reported. The selected self-statements were then
re-phrased into grammatically correct complete sentences which preserved the original
wording to the greatest degree possible. This process yielded a pool of 35 potential
measure items containing multiple exemplars of all four of the possible combinations of
affective valence (positive or negative) and attentional focus (self-focused or otherfocused) theorized to be relevant to speaking anxiety.
Self-statement item endorsement study. To ensure that the potential measure items
remained valid and generalizable correlates of speaking anxiety following their
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conversion from the original listed thoughts, another study was performed utilizing a
sample of 91 undergraduate students. In a similar fashion to the previous study, these
participants were asked to make a three minute extemporaneous speech on one of several
standardized topics. The experimental situation was modified to include two audience
members, in addition to the video camera, in the room in which the speech was given.
This change was made in response to indications from the previous study that being
unable to see the purported evaluators lessened the pressure of speaking somewhat.
Participants were again told that the audience would be rating their speech; however,
while the audience members were instructed to hold clipboards and appear to be making
notes during the speech, no actual ratings were made. As before, participants were asked
to provide estimations and then ratings of their anxiety and performance on a 0-100
SUDS scale. For this study, an endorsement measure of self-statements was substituted
for the thought-listing production measure used in the previous investigation. Following
the speech, participants were presented with a list of the 35 potential measure items and
asked to indicate which of the thoughts they experienced while speaking. The participants
also completed the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (Paul, 1966) and a short
demographic measure.
In order to assess whether the self-statement items maintained associations with
public speaking anxiety in their revised forms, bivariate correlations were calculated
between each of the 35 items and the three specific measures of public speaking anxiety
taken (the Personal Report of Confidence and the pre- and post-speech self-report
ratings). Results indicated that of the 35 potential measure items, 24 were correlated with
all three measures at a statistically significant level (α < .05), and of the remaining items,

68
six were correlated with two of the three measures at the .05 level, and three were
correlated with one. Only two of the items failed to reach statistical significance with any
of the public speaking anxiety measures. It should be noted that the pre-speech estimation
of anxiety was the measure which most commonly failed to correlate with the proposed
items, which occurred in nine cases. In the four instances where significant correlations
were obtained between the other two members, this may reflect variance in the ability of
participants to accurately predict their own anxiety before speaking rather than a lack of
relationship between the potential items and the construct of interest. The overall pattern
of results obtained from this study suggests a strong basis for the validity of the potential
items employed in the current study.
Affective valence and attentional focus rating. Finally, in order to ensure that the
35 prospective measure items reflected an appropriate range of combinations of positive
or negative affective valence and self or other-focus of attention, each item was rated on
both dimensions by two independent raters. Both raters were trained to make these
evaluations using standardized criteria guidelines authored by the primary researcher of
the current study. These criteria included a third response option for both affective
valence (reflecting neutral affect) and attentional focus (reflecting undifferentiated focus),
providing a total of nine categories to allow the raters greater flexibility in response
options. Reliability analysis indicated that the raters reached perfect agreement on all 35
of the items, Kappa = 1.0 (p < .0001). Of the 35 potential items, 7 were judged to be selffocused and positive, 16 were judged to be self-focused and negative, 3 were judged to be
other-focused and positive, and the remaining 8 were judged to be other-focused and
negative. None of the items were judged to contain undifferentiated focus of attention or
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neutral affective valence. The over-representation of negatively valenced items, and selffocused negative items in particular, is reflective of empirical studies (e.g. Beazley,
Glass, Chambless, & Arnkoff, 2001; Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Pineles &
Mineka, 2005; Woody, 1996) documenting the importance of these factors in predicting
social anxiety.
Goals and Hypotheses of the Current Study
The primary aim of the current study is to produce a self-report measure of public
speaking anxiety through factor analysis of items adapted from empirically-generated
cognitive self-statements. The first aim of the study is to use exploratory factor-analytic
methods and item-total correlations to determine empirically which of the 35 prospective
items are appropriate for inclusion in the final measure. In addition to generating the
measure, the current study also seeks to gather preliminary psychometric data regarding
internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity with other measures of
speaking and social anxiety. The overarching goal of the investigation is to provide initial
data to establish the measure as a reliable and valid assessment of public speaking anxiety
that offers tangible predictive benefits in comparison to existing measures. Specific
reliability and validity hypotheses for the study include:
1. Cronbach‟s alpha estimates of internal reliability for the final measure in an
undergraduate sample will fall into the good to excellent range of .80 to .95 as described
by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994).
2. The final measure will demonstrate convergent validity with the Personal
Report of Confidence as a Speaker (Paul, 1966), an existing measure of public speaking
anxiety. Due to the equivalence of the constructs being assessed by both measures, the
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effect size is expected to be in the high range of r =.5 or above as described by Cohen
(1988).
3. The final version of the SCAS will demonstrate discriminant validity with the
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969) and the Social Avoidance
and Distress Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), which are measures of negative evaluation
fears and anxiety-related social avoidance behaviors respectively. Since these are general
social anxiety measures and not specific to public speaking situations, the size of this
effect is expected to be lower than that displayed between the final measure and the
Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker, falling in the moderate range of roughly .3
as described by Cohen (1988).
4. The final version of the SCAS will demonstrate convergent validity with the
public self-consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier,
& Buss, 1975), which measures self-focusing tendencies in social situations. Since selffocusing tendencies are theorized to be of particular importance in public speaking
anxiety, the size of the effect is expected to be in the moderate range of roughly r = .3 as
described by Cohen (1988).
5. The final SCAS will demonstrate discriminant validity with the private selfconsciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss,
1975), which measures self-focusing for introspection and personal awareness. Since this
construct is not theorized to contribute to public speaking anxiety, the size of the effect is
expected to be in the non-existent or trivial range of r < .1 as described by Cohen (1988).
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CHAPTER 2
Method
The current study is part of a larger line of research aimed at producing a
cognitive self-statement measure of public speaking anxiety, and specifically contributes
initial data on factor structure, reliability, and validity using a sample of undergraduates
attending a mid-sized public university located in the Midwest. A primary goal of this
study is the creation of a measure of public speaking anxiety that is more empiricallybased and more specific to the public speaking situation than existing measures. To this
end, the study builds upon previous work in which public speaking-specific cognitions
were collected from anxious and non-anxious individuals using the thought-listing
method (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997) and then re-validated using an
endorsement-based strategy (Glass & Arnkoff, 1997). These cognitive self-statements
were previously evaluated for emotional valence and focus of attention by independent
raters, and were subsequently utilized as potential measure items employed in the current
study. The resultant data was used to create a final measure from the pool of prospective
items, which was then analyzed for convergent validity with existing measures of public
speaking anxiety, social anxiety, and self-focused attention.
Participants
Participants were 367 undergraduate students enrolled in Psychology courses at
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Of these, 201 participants (54.8% of sample)
were female, and 166 participants (45.2% of the sample) were male. The mean age of
participants was 20.6 years (SD= 3.5). The predominant ethnic groups in the sample were
White, non-Hispanic, reported by 239 participants (65.1%) and Black or African-
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American, reported by 96 participants (26.2%). Complete demographic data is presented
in Table 1. All participants were compensated with course credit for their participation.
No restrictions were placed on subject recruitment.
Procedure
Participants presented for data collection sessions in groups. An undergraduate or
graduate research assistant serving as the experimenter for the session briefed the
participants in full on their rights as subjects and obtained informed consent for study
participation. Participants were told that the intent of the study was to collect data about
the ways undergraduates think and behave, and that they would be answering questions
about their experiences in public speaking and social situations. Following the informed
consent procedure, participants were given a packet of self-report questionnaire surveys
containing the prospective public speaking anxiety measure items, the Personal Report of
Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966), the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale
(FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969), the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS; Watson
& Friend, 1969), the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975),
and a demographic questionnaire. For some participants (n = 196), the measures were
included in a mass survey of undergraduates alongside other psychological measures not
germane to the present research. After completion of the entire packet of measures,
participants were presented with a debriefing form explaining the goals of the study in
greater detail, thanked for their participation, and dismissed.
Measures
Prospective Items for Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale. Thirty-five
potential items designed to assess public speaking anxiety related cognitions (Beck &
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Rodriguez, 2006) for the measure of interest were administered to participants in a selfreport questionnaire. All items took the form of declarative self-statements about public
speaking that were adapted from a previous study (Beck, Huber, Marin, & Rodriguez,
2005) which collected cognitions from participants who had participated in a public
speaking task. The current study instructed participants to visualize their last few public
speaking experiences as a point of reference before responding to the items. Item
responses were made on a five-point rating scale ranging from 0 – 4, with a response of 0
indicating that the participant “never” experiences this cognition, a response of 2
indicating that the participant experiences this cognition “about half the time,” and a
response of 4 indicating that the participant “always” experiences this cognition while
speaking in public.
Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker. The Personal Report of Confidence
as a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966) is a 30-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess
public speaking fears. Responses are made in a true/false format. The PRCS was
developed as the short form of a longer measure (Gilkinson, 1942), and has remained in
continued use due to its effectiveness as a screening measure for public speaking anxiety
(Phillips, Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1997). Paul (1966) found that PRCS scores exhibited
similar patterns of change to self-reported anxiety scores following a public speaking
anxiety intervention, a good indicator of convergent validity. Daly (1978) obtained an
alpha reliability of .91 for the PRCS in one administration and an alpha reliability of .94
in a replication, both of which indicate excellent internal reliability. Finally, Phillips,
Jones, Rieger, and Snell (1997) found no main effects of gender or age on PRCS score,
indicating discriminant validity for the instrument. The Cronbach‟s alpha internal
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reliability statistic for the PRCS in the current sample was calculated at .90, indicating
excellent internal reliability.
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale. The Social Avoidance and Distress Scale
(SADS), developed by Watson and Friend (1969), is a 28-item true/false format scale
designed to assess tendencies toward anxious and avoidant reactions in social situations.
The scale consists of two subscales, which assess avoidance and distress, respectively.
Watson and Friend (1969) reported a Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 reliability statistic of
.94 for the SADS as well as a product-moment correlation of .75 between the two
subscales. Leary (1991) observes that the SADS displays correlations of r ≥ .75 with
many other measures of social anxiety, that high scorers on the scale report greater
anxiety in real interactions than do low scorers, and that the scale has been successfully
used as a measure of outcome in a multitude of clinical investigations into social anxiety
treatment. Thus, the SADS demonstrates very good convergent validity. The Cronbach‟s
alpha internal reliability statistic for the SADS in the current sample was calculated at
.92, indicating excellent internal reliability.
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. The Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE)
is a 30-item true/false format scale developed by Watson and Friend (1969) to assess
negative evaluation fears. The FNE has excellent internal consistency, rKR20 = .94. The
FNE was developed concurrently with the SADS scale, and the constructs each scale
assesses are conceptualized as complementary factors in producing social anxiety. As
such, the FNE correlates moderately with the SADS scale (r = .51), and evidence shows
that high FNE scorers report more anxiety in evaluative settings and more concern about
being negatively evaluated than do low scorers (Leary, 1991). The FNE is widely used in
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empirical research into specific components of social anxiety (e.g. Rapee & Lim, 1992;
Stopa & Clark, 1993) which have found it able to reliably differentiate socially phobic
individuals from control subjects, providing a strong indication of its validity. The
Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability statistic for the FNE in the current sample was
calculated at .92, indicating excellent internal reliability.
Self-Consciousness Scale. The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein,
Scheier, & Buss, 1975) is a 23-item self-report measure of self-consciousness. Responses
to the scale items are made on a 5-point Likert scale anchored by “not at all like me” and
“very much like me.” In addition to a total score, the SCS yields three subscale scores,
which respectively measure public self-consciousness, private self-consciousness, and
social anxiety. Test-retest data following a two-week interval (Fenigstein, Scheier, &
Buss, 1975) indicate that the SCS displays adequate reliability, with correlations of .80
for the total score, .84 for the public self-consciousness subscale, .79 for the private selfconsciousness subscale, and .73 for the social anxiety subscale. The SCS is the most
commonly employed self-report measure of self-focused attention (Mor & Wilquist,
2007), and has been widely employed in social anxiety research. The public selfconsciousness subscale has demonstrated particularly robust associations with social
anxiety (Pilkonis, 1977; Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978) and related constructs
such as fear of negative evaluation (Monfries & Kafer, 1994), suggesting that both the
SCS and the construct of self-consciousness in general have a valid relationship with
social anxiety. Additionally, Carver and Glass (1976) demonstrated discriminant validity
for the public and private self-consciousness subscales of the SCS by finding that neither
subscale correlates with measures of intelligence, need for achievement, test anxiety,
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impulsivity, or activity level. The Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability statistic for the
SCS in the current sample was calculated at .83, indicating good internal reliability.
Demographics questionnaire. Participants were also administered a short selfreport questionnaire designed especially for use in this study. This measure assessed the
demographic variables of gender, age, ethnicity, and year in school. Participants also
provided an estimate of the length of time that has elapsed since their last public speech
or presentation by selecting from a series of time ranges.
Analytic Strategy
Data analyses for the current study were designed to accomplish two major goals.
The first goal was the empirical evaluation of the 35 prospective measure items for
inclusion in a final version of the Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale, and provision
of descriptive statistics regarding internal reliability and factor structure of this final
measure. To accomplish this, an exploratory factor analysis and item-total correlations
were performed on the 35 prospective measure items. Following guidelines suggested by
Kline (1986), items which do not load clearly on a single factor, do not load on any factor
at a minimum of .4, or do not correlate with the total at a minimum of .5 were dropped.
Following the item elimination process, Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability was
calculated for the final measure.
The second major goal of the current research was examining the convergent and
discriminant validity of the final measure. Since the SCAS was designed to specifically
measure public speaking anxiety, the pattern of Pearson‟s r correlations between it and
other measures with varying degrees of overlap with the construct of public speaking
anxiety were examined. As such, these correlations were interpreted as measures of effect
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size, using criteria specified by Cohen (1988), rather than for significance testing
purposes. The pattern of correlations with the highest degree of theoretical overlap with
construct of public speaking anxiety is as follows: highest effect size observed between
the SCAS and the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (Paul, 1966), moderate
effect sizes between the SCAS and the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson &
Friend, 1969), the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), and the
Public Self-Consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier,
& Buss, 1975), and a miniscule effect size observed between the SCAS and the Private
Self-Consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale. Convergent- and
discriminant validity hypothesis testing were interpreted based on degree of resemblance
to these effect size patterns.
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CHAPTER 3
Results
Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics. 367 participants completed the study. 55 percent of the
sample (n = 201) was female. The mean age of study participants was 20.6 years (SD =
3.5). The most frequently endorsed ethnicities were White, non-Hispanic (n = 239,
65.1%) and Black/African American (n = 96, 26.2%), which combined to account for 91
percent of the sample. Eighty percent of the sample (n = 297) reported that they had
given a public speech or presentation in the last six months. Complete demographics for
gender, ethnicity, and reported last public speech or presentation are presented in Table 1.
Prospective item evaluation. Items for inclusion in the final measure were
selected from the 35 prospective measure items based on the results of exploratory factor
analysis and item-total correlations. Criteria for item exclusion were defined before
conducting the analysis. As suggested by Kline (1986), it was decided that items which
did not load clearly onto a single factor, load onto any factor at a minimum of .4, or
exhibit an item-total correlation of .5 or higher would be dropped. With regard to
statistical assumptions, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was
calculated to be .97, indicating that partial correlations among variables meet criteria for
factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), and Bartlett‟s Test of Sphericity was
significant at .000, indicating the factorability of the obtained correlation matrix
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
An initial exploratory factor analysis was conducted using the Maximum
Likelihood extraction method to determine the appropriate number of factors to retain.
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Table 1
Gender, Ethnicity, and Time since Last Speech Demographics (N = 367)
Number

Percent of total

Gender
Female

201

54.8

Male

166

45.2

American Indian/Alaska Native

2

.5

Asian

6

1.6

Black/African-American

96

26.2

Hispanic/Latino/a

12

3.3

1

1.7

239

65.1

11

3.0

101

27.5

About 1 month

51

13.9

About 3 months

91

24.8

About 6 months

54

14.7

About 1 year

40

10.9

More than 1 year ago

27

7.4

3

.8

Ethnicity

Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
White, non-Hispanic
Other
Time since last public speech or presentation
Two weeks or less

Never given public speech/presentation
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Several methods of examining the data were employed in making this determination.
Using the criterion of retaining factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2001) indicated that four factors should be retained, as the initial eigenvalues were
16.7, 2.3, 1.3, and 1.1. However, a visual examination of the scree plot (Figure 1)
appeared to indicate that a two or three-factor solution would be a more appropriate fit to
the data. Conduction of parallel analysis, a method which involves the comparison of raw
eigenvalue data to mean values of randomized alternative matrices (Hayton, Allen, &
Scarpello, 2004) indicated a three-factor solution when the more conservative 95th
percentile comparison of parallel matrix means is employed (Table 2).
These differing indicators, coupled with the large amount of variance accounted
for by the first factor, made the decision about extraction a difficult and somewhat
ambiguous one. Ultimately, given the results of the parallel analysis and the fact that the
initial eigenvalue for the fourth factor only slightly exceeded the cutoff of 1, the decision
was made to extract three factors from the data. This choice was also made in
consideration of the research‟s stated goal of examining the data for interpretable focus of
attention and affective-valence factors, which would have been difficult or impossible if a
one or two-factor extraction had been chosen.
A factor analysis specifying a three-factor model was then performed using
Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization. A summary of the factor loadings,
eigenvalues, and commonalities for the rotated solution is presented in Table 3. With
regard to factor loadings, Items 4 (My eyes are wandering all over the room) and 14
(They think I am talking too fast) were dropped for failing to load at .4 on any of the three
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Figure 1. Scree plot for Maximum Likelihood factor analysis of 35 prospective Speaking
Cognitions and Attention Scale items.
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Table 2
Parallel Analysis Results: Actual and Random Eigenvalues (N = 367)
Actual Eigenvalue

Average Eigenvalue 95th Percentile Eigenvalue

16.37

.74

.81

1.90

.65

.72

.81

.59

.65

.56

.54

.59

.48

.49

.53

.39

.45

.49

.37

.41

.45

.25
.37
.41
th
Note. Boldface indicates actual eigenvalues which are larger than 95 percentile
eigenvalues, indicating a factor is appropriate for retention.
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Table 3
Summary of Rotated Factor Loadings for Varimax Three-Factor Solution for the 35
Prospective Items for the Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale (N = 367)
Factor Loading
Item

1

2

3

Communality

1.

.38

.66

.12

.60

2.

.35

.48

.41

.51

3.

.32

.74

.13

.66

4.

.08

.39

.22

.20

5.

.66

.32

.20

.57

6.

.37

.69

.26

.69

7.

.33

.43

.44

.50

8.

.65

.21

.32

.58

9.

.16

.37

.13

.18

10.

.41

.57

.34

.61

11.

.16

.62

.39

.56

12.

.36

.47

.55

.65

13.

.71

.30

.31

.69

14.

.18

.29

.29

.20

15.

.24

.60

.36

.55

16.

.44

.51

.46

.66

17.

.70

.09

.28

.58

18.
.36
.47
.29
.44
Note. Boldface indicates highest factor loadings over minimum criteria of .4 (Table 3
continues)
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(Table 3 continued)
Factor Loading
Item

1

2

3

19.

.69

.14

.29

.57

20.

.11

.54

.37

.44

21.

.30

.62

.38

.62

22.

.80

.31

.17

.77

23.

.22

.52

.16

.35

24.

.24

.51

.33

.42

25.

.68

.49

.14

.71

26.

.30

.37

.42

.42

27.

.73

.47

.08

.75

28.

.30

.37

.60

.52

29.

.34

.44

.58

.65

30.

.73

.32

.24

.70

31.

.20

.43

.30

.32

32.

.55

.34

.24

.48

33.

.33

.56

.34

.54

34.

.78

.24

.24

.72

35.

.36

.31

.62

.61

7.54

7.23

4.21

% of variance 21.55

20.67

12.04

Eigenvalues

Communality

Note. Boldface indicates highest factor loadings over minimum criteria of .4
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remaining factors, and Item 7 (I look stiff as a board standing here) was dropped due to
equal loadings on factor 2 and 3.
Examination of item-total correlations revealed that the previously removed Items
4 and 14 also did not meet the minimum item-total correlation of .5 needed for retention
in the measure (Kline, 1986). Additionally, Item 9 (I hope I don’t stutter while speaking)
did not meet this criterion and was dropped from the final measure. Finally, Item 31 (I
keep fidgeting with my hands) was dropped because content of the item was judged to be
more behavioral in nature and at odds with the study‟s goal of creating a cognitivelyfocused measure of public speaking anxiety. Item total correlations for all 35 prospective
SCAS items are presented in Table 4.
Final measure characteristics. The deletion of Items 4, 7, 9, 14, and 31 resulted in
a 30 item final measure. Since all responses were made on a 0 to 4 scale, with 0
indicating that the cognition is “never” present and 4 indicating that the cognition is
“always” present, potential total scores on this measure range from 0 to 120. The 11
measure items with positive or facilitative content (Items 5, 8, 13, 17, 19, 22, 25, 27, 30,
32, and 34) were reverse-coded so that higher total scores on the final measure indicate
greater public speaking anxiety. The mean total score on the measure for the sample was
found to be 49.7, with a standard deviation of 22.7. Furthermore, total scores on the
measure were normally distributed around the mean, indicating that the scale does not
demonstrate floor or ceiling effects. Item-total correlations for the measure ranged from
.56 to .81, indicating that each of the 30 measure items is strongly related to the overall
score.
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Table 4
Corrected Item-Total Correlations for the 35 Prospective Items for the Speaking
Cognitions and Attention Scale (N = 367)
Corrected Item-Total
Item
Correlation
1. I feel anxious giving this speech.

.69

2. I look stupid to the audience.

.69

3. I am starting to feel uneasy.

.71

4. My eyes are wandering all over the room.

.40

5. The audience sees that I am calm.*

.68

6. I am scared of this entire situation.

.78

7. I look stiff as a board standing here.

.67

8. I think I‟m doing well.*

.66

9. I hope I don‟t stutter while speaking.

.40

10. They can see that I am anxious.

.77

11. My body feels really hot.

.67

12. I sound stupid talking to these people.

.77

13. I look confident standing up here.*

.75

14. They think I am talking too fast.

.43

15. I am trembling standing up here.

.69

16. The audience can tell that I am afraid.

.79

17. They think I am doing well.*

.60

18. My voice sounds timid.

.65

19. I am doing well with the speech.*

.62

Note: * denotes reverse-scored item.

(Table 4 continues)
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(Table 4 continued)
Item

Corrected Item-Total
Correlation

20. This speech is making me sweat.

.58

21. I am panicking; I want to get out of here.

.75

22. I look comfortable giving this speech.*

.74

23. I hope I don‟t look stupid in front of these people.

.55

24. I‟m going to freeze up.

.61

25. I am comfortable giving this speech.*

.77

26. They can see that I am uncomfortable.

.61

27. I am calm while standing in front of this audience.*

.76

28. The speech I am giving is horrible.

.62

29. I look stiff to the audience.

.75

30. I am confident with my performance.*

.74

31. I keep fidgeting with my hands.

.54

32. This isn‟t so bad.*

.64

33. I am uncomfortable giving this speech.

.71

34. I look confident to them.*

.71

35. The audience sees that I am doing a bad job.

.69

Note: * denotes reverse-scored item.

88
SCAS factor loadings. With regard to factor structure, the rotated matrix of the
items comprising the final measure contains three factors. A summary of the items
comprising each factor and their loadings, excluding the dropped items, is presented in
Table 5. The first factor, which accounts for 21% of the total variance, is composed of the
11 reverse-coded positive items (Items 5, 8, 13, 17, 19, 22, 25, 27, 30, 32, and 34). Since
the content of all these items reflect facilitative cognitions with respect to the speaking
task (e.g. Item 5: The audience sees that I am calm; Item 13: I look confident standing up
here) this factor will henceforth be referred to as Positive Performance Cognitions (PPC).
Cronbach‟s alpha reliability analysis indicated that the PPC subscale displayed a
reliability coefficient of .95, indicating excellent internal reliability (Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994). The second factor, which accounts for 20% of the total variance, is
composed of 14 items (Items 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 33) that
reflect mild to moderately negative cognitions about public speaking (e.g. Item 1: I feel
anxious giving this speech; Item 18: My voice sounds timid) and will be referred to as
Negative Performance Cognitions (NPC). Cronbach‟s alpha reliability analysis indicated
that the NPC subscale displayed a reliability coefficient of .87, indicating good to
excellent internal reliability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The third factor, which
accounts for 10% of the total variance, is composed of 5 items (Items 12, 26, 28, 29, and
35) reflecting cognitions about speaking performance that are more markedly negative
and judgmental than those contained in the Negative Performance Cognitions factor (e.g.
Item 28: The speech I am giving is horrible; Item 35: The audience sees that I am doing a
bad job) and will be referred to as Catastrophic Performance Cognitions (CPC).
Cronbach‟s alpha reliability analysis indicated that the CPC subscale displayed a
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Table 5
Factor Loadings for Varimax Three-Factor Solution for 30 Retained Speaking
Cognitions and Attention Scale Items
Factor
Item
Loading
Factor 1: Positive Performance Cognitions
5. The audience sees that I am calm.

.66

8. I think I‟m doing well.

.65

13. I look confident standing up here.

.71

17. They think I am doing well.

.70

19. I am doing well with the speech.

.69

22. I look comfortable giving this speech.

.80

25. I am comfortable giving this speech.

.68

27. I am calm while standing in front of this audience.

.73

30. I am confident with my performance.

.73

32. This isn‟t so bad.

.55

34. I look confident to them.

.78

Factor 2: Negative Performance Cognitions
1. I feel anxious giving this speech.

.66

2. I look stupid to the audience.

.48

3. I am starting to feel uneasy.

.74

6. I am scared of this entire situation.

.69

10. They can see that I am anxious.

.57

11. My body feels really hot.

.62

Note. N = 367 and α = .97 for entire measure.

(Table 5 continues)
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(Table 5 continued)
Item

Factor
Loading

Factor 2: Negative Performance Cognitions
15. I am trembling standing up here.

.60

16. The audience can tell that I am afraid.

.51

18. My voice sounds timid.

.47

20. This speech is making me sweat.

.54

21. I am panicking; I want to get out of here.

.62

23. I hope I don‟t look stupid in front of these people.

.52

24. I‟m going to freeze up.

.51

33. I am uncomfortable giving this speech.

.56

Factor 3: Catastrophic Performance Cognitions
12. I sound stupid talking to these people.

.55

26. They can see that I am uncomfortable.

.42

28. The speech I am giving is horrible.

.60

29. I look stiff to the audience.

.58

35. The audience sees that I am doing a bad job.

.62

Note. N = 367 and α = .97 for entire measure.
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reliability coefficient of .88, indicating good to excellent internal reliability (Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994).
Convergent and discriminant validity analytic strategy. After formulating the
final 30 item measure, convergent and discriminant validity between total scores on this
measure and the other administered measures was examined using Pearson‟s r bivariate
correlations as measures of effect size. The accompanying measures administered in the
study are designed to assess constructs with varying degrees of conceptual overlap with
public speaking anxiety. The measure with the highest expected degree of common
variance with the measure of interest is the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker
(PRCS; Paul, 1966), which is also designed to measure public speaking anxiety. The Fear
of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969) and Social Avoidance and
Distress Scale (SADS; Watson & Friend, 1969) are measures of general social anxiety
and are not specific to the public speaking task, and as such, should have a moderate
degree of common variance with the measure of interest, in accordance with the
prevailing conceptualization of public speaking anxiety as a specific form of generalized
social anxiety (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
The Public Self-Consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS)
measures dispositional tendencies to focus attention on the self in public or social
situations as a means of self-regulation. As discussed above, self-focused attention is
theorized to play a key role in social and performance anxiety, and one of the goals of the
present study is to incorporate focus of attention elements into assessing fears of public
speaking. Therefore, this subscale is expected to share a moderate amount of common
variance with the measure of interest. Finally, the private self-consciousness subscale of
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the SCS measures the dispositional tendency to focus attention on the self for the
purposes of insight or introspection. This construct does not share any conceptual
similarity with public speaking anxiety, and it is expected to display a very low amount
of common variance with the measure of interest to demonstrate the discriminant validity
of the measure. A correlation matrix summarizing the observed relationships between the
measures is presented in Table 6.
Summary of Results
Hypothesis 1: Cronbach’s alpha estimates of internal reliability for the final
measure in an undergraduate sample will fall into the good to excellent range of .80 to
.95 as described by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). This hypothesis was confirmed.
Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability in the assessed population for the final 30-item
Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale (SCAS) was calculated at α = .97, indicating an
extremely high level of internal consistency (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
Hypothesis 2: The final measure will demonstrate strong convergent validity with
the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (Paul, 1966), with an effect size in the
high range of r ≥ .5 as described by Cohen (1988). This hypothesis was confirmed.
Pearson‟s r bivariate correlation between PRCS and SCAS final measure total scores was
calculated at .84, indicating a very high degree of common variance between the two
scales.
Hypothesis 3: The final measure will also demonstrate moderate convergent
validity with the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969) and the
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), with an effect size falling
in the moderate range of approximately .3 as described by Cohen (1988). This hypothesis
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Table 6
Correlation Matrix of Convergent and Discriminant Validity Measure Scores (N =367)
SCAS*

FNE§
SADS‡

PRCS^

SCAS
PRCS
FNE
SADS
SCS Public
SCS Private
SCAS PPC
SCAS NPC

-

SCS Public**
SCAS PPC|
SCAS CPC±
SCS Private†
SCAS NPC`

.84

.38

.44

.18

-.02

-.90

.95

.88

-

.40

.47

.19

-.03

-.80

.78

.70

-

.51

.61

.26

-.31

.38

.37

-

.19

.07

-.42

.39

.39

-

.52

-.10

.22

.14

-

.05

.02

-.03

-

-.74

-.72

-

.81

SCAS CPC
Note. * Total score on 30-item Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale. ^ Total score on Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker Scale. § Total
score on Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. ‡ Total score on Social Avoidance and Distress Scale. ** Subscale score on Self-Consciousness Scale – Public SelfConsciousness subscale. † Subscale score on Self-Consciousness Scale – Private Self-Consciousness subscale. | Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and
Attention Scale – Positive Performance Cognitions subscale. ` Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale – Negative Performance Cognitions
subscale. ± Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale – Catastrophic Performance Cognitions subscale.
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was confirmed. The Pearson‟s r bivariate correlation between the FNE and the SCAS
final measure total scores was calculated at .38, and the Pearson‟s r correlation between
the SADS and the SCAS final measure total scores was calculated at .44. Both values
reflect a moderate amount of common variance, and are substantially smaller in
magnitude than the obtained correlation between the SCAS and PRCS.
Hypothesis 4: The final measure will demonstrate moderate convergent validity
with the public self-consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein,
Scheier, & Buss, 1975), with an effect size in the moderate range of roughly r = .3 as
described by Cohen (1988). This hypothesis was not confirmed. The Pearson‟s r
correlation between scores on the public self-consciousness subscale of the SCS and total
scores on the SCAS final measure was calculated at .18. This size of this effect is lower
than hypothesized, and smaller in magnitude than the observed correlations between the
SCAS and both the SADS and FNE. The obtained measurement better fits Cohen‟s
(1988) classification of a “small” effect size.
Hypothesis 5: The final measure will demonstrate discriminant validity with the
private self-consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier,
& Buss, 1975), with an effect size in the trivial range of r < .1 as described by Cohen
(1988). This hypothesis was confirmed. The Pearson‟s r correlation between scores on
the private self-consciousness subscale of the SCS and total scores on the SCAS final
measure was calculated at -.02, indicating a negligible effect size and little to no common
variance between the two measures. This relationship is substantially smaller than that
observed between the SCAS and all other measures employed in the study.
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Exploratory Analyses
In order to further investigate the lack of focus of attention effects in the factor
structure of the Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale in the current study, alpha
reliability and convergent and discriminant validity were also calculated for subscales
generated based on the ratings of attentional focus and affective valence made by trained
raters prior to the data collection process. These analyses were performed to examine the
possibility that grouping the final SCAS items based on combinations of attentional focus
and affective valence might yield different relationships with the convergent validity
variables, potentially suggesting effects of attentional focus not found in the main
analyses. After excluding the five prospective items not incorporated into the final
measure, the four subscales were as follows: self-focused, negative items, consisting of
Items 1, 3, 6, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 24, 28, and 33; self-focused, positive items,
consisting of Items 8, 13, 19, 22, 25, 27, 30, and 32; other-focused, negative items,
consisting of Items 2, 10, 16, 23, 26, 29, and 35; and other-focused, positive items,
consisting of Items 5, 17, and 34.
Cronbach‟s alpha reliability analyses indicated that the self-focused, negative and
the self-focused, positive subscales displayed identical reliability statistics of .93,
indicating excellent internal reliability for both. Internal reliability for the other-focused,
negative items was calculated at .87, indicating „good‟ reliability. Finally, the otherfocused, positive items displayed a reliability of .82, also indicating „good‟ reliability.
The shorter length of the other-focused, positive subscale likely accounts for some of the
lowered reliability in comparison to the other subscales.
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Convergent and discriminant validity analyses were repeated, again examining
Pearson‟s r correlations as measures of effect size. Correlations between all four
subscales, the SCAS total score, and the convergent and discriminant validity measures
are presented in matrix form in Table 7. Examination of the correlations reveals that each
of the four subscales correlates with the convergent validity measures in a pattern highly
similar to that observed with the SCAS total score in the main study; with the highest
observed correlations with the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker, moderate
correlations with the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale and the Social Avoidance and
Distress Scale, small-to-moderate correlations with the public self-consciousness
subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale, and extremely small correlations with the
private self-consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale. The effect sizes for
each of these correlations display a high degree of similarity to those observed with the
SCAS total score, with the exception of lower correlations between the public selfconsciousness subscale of the SCS and the other-focused, positive and self-focused,
positive SCAS subscales.
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Table 7
Exploratory Analysis: Correlation Matrix of Convergent and Discriminant Validity Measure Scores (N = 367)
SCAS*
SCAS SP|

SCAS
SCAS SP
SCAS OP
SCAS SN
SCAS ON
PRCS
FNE
SADS
SCS Public

-

SCAS OP`
SCAS ON{}
SCAS SN±
PRCS^

FNE§
SADS

SCS Public**
SCS Private†

-.90

-.80

.95

.94

.84

.38

.44

.18

-.02

-

.86

-.75

-.76

-.80

-.31

-.42

-.11

.04

-

-.63

-.69

-.71

-.27

-.37

-.06

.06

-

.90

.78

.37

.40

.19

-.01

-

.76

.40

.42

.20

.00

-

.40

.47

.19

-.03

-

.51

.61

.26

-

.76

.07

-

.52

SCS Private
Note. * Total score on 30-item Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale. ^ Total score on Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker Scale. § Total score on
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. ‡ Total score on Social Avoidance and Distress Scale. ** Subscale score on Self-Consciousness Scale – Public SelfConsciousness subscale. † Subscale score on Self-Consciousness Scale – Private Self-Consciousness subscale. | Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and
Attention Scale – Self-focused Positive Items. ` Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale – Other-focused Positive Items. ± Subscale score on
Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale – Self-focused Negative Items. {} Subscale score on Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale – Other-focused
Negative Items
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CHAPTER 4
Discussion
Summary of Results
The present study utilized an exploratory factor analysis of an initial sample of 35
empirically-generated prospective questionnaire items to create the Speaking Cognitions
and Attention Scale (SCAS), a 30-item self-report measure of public speaking anxiety.
The internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity properties of the final
scale were also examined. Results indicated that the SCAS has a 3- factor structure and
displays excellent internal reliability and strong item-total correlations. Convergent
validity analyses with other self-report measures largely followed the hypothesized
pattern, with a high correlation found between the SCAS and another measure of public
speaking anxiety, moderate correlations between the SCAS and two measures of
generalized social anxiety, and no statistical relationship with a measure of introspection
that is theoretically unrelated to public speaking anxiety. However, the statistical
relationship between the SCAS and a measure of self-focused attention in public
situations was not as large as hypothesized.
Implications of Obtained Results
Item Elimination Process
The first goal of the current study was selecting self-statement items for the final
measure from the initial pool of 35 prospective items administered to all participants.
Items were selected for inclusion using criteria suggested by Kline (1986), namely,
clearly loading on one factor at .4 or higher and displaying an item-total correlation of .5
or higher. Selection of these criteria was intended to increase the likelihood that the
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resulting final SCAS measure would display a clear factor structure and a high degree of
specificity for the measurement of public speaking anxiety.
The selection process eliminated 5 of the prospective items, leaving a 30-item
final measure. Three items (Item 4: My eyes are wandering all over the room, Item 7: I
look stiff as a board standing here, and Item 14: They think I am talking too fast) were
dropped for failing to meet the predetermined criteria for factor loading. A fourth item
(Item 9: I hope I don’t stutter while speaking) was removed for failing to correlate with
the total at .5 or higher. Finally, a fifth item was removed (Item 31: I keep fidgeting with
my hands) because its content was judged to be more reflective of a behavior than a
cognition, and thus, at odds with the intent of the scale.
The fact that only a modest percentage (14.3%) of the 35 prospective items was
removed during the selection process suggests that the naturalistic thought-sampling
process used to generate these items was successful in measuring a narrow and consistent
domain of interest. Furthermore, the strong item-total correlations and defined 3-factor
structure found in the final 30-item SCAS measure provide a positive indication that
empirically sampled cognitive self-statements can be translated into a cohesive scale with
relatively little modification. In all, the process of constructing the final SCAS scale and
the resulting output appears to lend support to the claims of cognitive assessment theory
(Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever,
& Larsen, 1982) as well as the viability of the current study‟s goal of using empirical
methods to create a measure of public speaking anxiety.
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SCAS Internal Characteristics
Another aim of the current research is the acquisition of initial data on the
reliability of the final 30-item iteration of the SCAS. The high Cronbach‟s alpha internal
reliability estimate of α = .97 obtained for the SCAS in the sample demonstrates that
participant responses on the 30 items comprising the scale exhibited highly consistent
patterns with one another. This provides a strong indicator that the SCAS measure items
represent a specific construct (Streiner, 2003). High internal reliability estimates have
traditionally been viewed as a prerequisite for the use of a psychometric instrument for
research and clinical purposes (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
Some authors (e.g. Kline, 1986; Streiner, 2003) have advanced the argument that
very high Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability scores of .90 and above may actually be
harmful to the content validity of a measure if attained by utilizing items that measure
only one aspect of a construct at the expense of other important dimensions. In the case
of the SCAS, however, the measure was specifically conceived to focus narrowly on
speaking-anxiety related cognitions, based on the emphasis placed on the causal role of
cognitive factors in contemporary models of the construct (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995;
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), as well as the work of psychometric theorists (e.g. Glass &
Arnkoff, 1997; Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997) who emphasize the external
validity benefits of creating highly specific cognitively-focused measures of
psychological constructs. Therefore, the very large Cronbach‟s alpha obtained in the
current study may be a positive indication that the SCAS has fulfilled the original
intention of specifically measuring speaking-anxiety related cognitions.
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SCAS Factor Structure and Affective Valence
An exploratory factor analytic procedure indicated a three-factor solution for the
items on the SCAS (Table 5). Examination of the items comprising each factor indicated
that within each factor, items appeared to be grouped according to affective valence. The
Positive Performance Cognitions (PPC) factor grouped together facilitative thoughts
about the speaking situation and the likelihood of performance success, typified by
thoughts about “doing well,” “being calm,” and “looking comfortable.” The Negative
Performance Cognitions (NPC) factor delineated debilitative, anxiety-related cognitions,
typified by thoughts about “being anxious,” “feeling hot,” and “sounding timid.” The
Catastrophic Performance Cognitions (CPC) factor collected items reflecting cognitions
which were more markedly negative and judgmental than the NPC factor, typified by
thoughts of “looking stupid,” “doing a bad job,” and “giving a horrible speech.”
The identification of three separate affective valence factors within the sample is
somewhat contrary to expectations, as the majority of theoretical and empirical work on
anxiety processes and cognitive assessment (e.g. Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997;
Carver, 2006; Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993) emphasizes a
straightforward distinction between positively and negatively valenced emotions. The
current data suggests that with regard to speaking anxiety, a qualitative distinction may
exist between negative thoughts that refer to basic anxiety-related concerns and those that
refer to directly to negative evaluation by others or extremely poor social performance. It
should be noted that the functional aspects of a more straightforward positive-negative
distinction appear to be essentially preserved within the sample, with the PPC factor
correlating with less anxiety on the PRCS and SADS and both the NPC and CPC factors
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correlating with more anxiety on these measures (Table 6). This lends credence to the
notion that positively-valenced cognitions are associated with facilitation of speaking
performance and negatively-valenced cognitions are associated with debilitation of
speaking performance, although the data in the current study is limited by a lack of
behaviorally specific dependant variables.
Potential implications of CPC factor. Although it is currently unclear why the
items constituting the Catastrophic Performance Cognitions factor on the SCAS were
found to be a distinct factor rather than being subsumed under the Negative Performance
Cognitions factor, a few potential explanations can be advanced. The most
straightforward possibility is that the CPC items tap into a qualitatively different variant
of public speaking anxiety than do the NPC items. As previously discussed, public
speaking anxiety is the most common form of social anxiety, with up to a third of
Americans reporting a significant degree of anxiety or avoidance regarding speaking in
public (Kessler, Stein, & Berglund, 1998). Within this population, however, only 30%
may meet diagnostic criteria for a DSM diagnosis of Social Phobia. The distinction
between clinical and subclinical experiences of social anxiety typically implies that the
former involves more severe experiences of anxiety and avoidance and more pervasive
fears of being negatively evaluated by others (American Psychiatric Association, 1994;
Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993). Since the CPC factor is largely constituted of
items which explicitly address negative evaluation of speaking performance, endorsement
of these items may indicate greater concerns about being negatively evaluated and a
higher likelihood of meeting criteria for a Social Phobia diagnosis.
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Unfortunately, the currently available data is insufficient to draw strong
conclusions regarding the validity of this interpretation. Convergent validity analyses
(Table 6) indicate that the scores on the CPC factor are not more highly correlated with
total scores on the SAD, PRCS, or FNE scales when compared with scores on the PPC
or NPC factors. Although this would seem to indicate that endorsement of items on the
Catastrophic Performance Cognitions factor is not associated with more severe anxiety,
broader support is needed before making a substantive conclusion to this effect.
Specifically, correlating the SCAS with more specific behavioral data, such as participant
ratings following in vivo exposure and assessment of functional impairment reflecting the
DSM-IV criteria for Social Phobia, specific type, would be a more externally valid test
than the self-report measures employed in the current study, and would likely yield more
robust results.
A second potential explanation for the identification of two distinct negativelyvalenced factors in the current study addresses the process of experiencing and
interpreting positive and negative emotional experiences while speaking in public. As
noted above, popular cognitive models of social anxiety, such as the one proposed by
Clark and Wells (1995), focus on the role that attention to internal and external feedback
plays in creating and sustaining the anxiety response. Positive affective experiences, such
as feeling confident or receiving praise from others, are thought to indicate good social
performance, while negative affective experiences, such as experiencing anxiety
symptoms or being criticized by others, are thought to indicate poor social performance
and increased likelihood of negative evaluation by others. In situations where negative
evaluations by others appear possible or likely, these theories predict that individuals will
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be more attuned to negative experiences that constitute internal and external signifiers of
poor performance.
Given that public speaking is widely perceived as a threatening or anxietyprovoking task, individuals in the general population may be more attuned to subtleties
and variations in negative affective experiences related to speaking in public because of
the greater importance of these experiences in providing anxiety-related feedback. If this
is indeed the case, then this phenomenon may have informed the distinct response
patterns that resulted in the Negative and Catastrophic Performance Cognitions factors
observed in the current sample. By contrast, individuals may be less predisposed to attend
to variations in positive affective experiences in public speaking, possibly because such
experiences may generally signify “performing well enough.” If so, this may account for
the single SCAS Positive Performance Cognitions factor observed in the current sample.
SCAS Factor Structure and Focus of Attention
Contrary to one of the stated goals of the current research, exploratory factor
analysis did not indicate that focus of attention played a role in the factor structure of the
SCAS in the current sample. One of the intended functions of the scale was to provide a
means of measuring the relative contributions of self- and other-focused attention in
public speaking anxiety in a retrospective self-report questionnaire. While the role of
self-focused attention in exacerbating social and performance anxiety has been discussed
thoroughly in both the theoretical (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee
& Heimberg, 1996) and empirical (Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Melchior &
Cheek, 1990; Monfries & Kafer, 1994; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000)
literatures, the attempt made by the current research to measure this construct as an
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underlying factor in the SCAS does not appear to have met with success, as evidenced by
the lack of discernable focus of attention elements in the factor structure of measure
responses, as well as the lack of observed differences in the magnitude of convergent
validity correlations between items judged to be self-focused and those judged to be
other-focused indicated by exploratory analyses.
Several potential explanations can be advanced as to why this is the case. One
possibility might be flaws in the manner in which focus of attention was conceptualized
and evaluated in the in-vivo speaking cognitions that formed the basis for the measure
items. This process equated focus of attention with the subjective personal pronouns
employed in the cognition, so that use of words such as “I” or “my” was interpreted to
denote self-focused attention, while use of words such as “they” or “these people” was
interpreted to denote other-focused attention. However, within the parameters of the
thought-listing method employed in this previous research, there is no conclusive way of
determining if an individual‟s word choice with regard to the subjective personal pronoun
provides an accurate reflection of his or her attentional focus while experiencing the
cognition. It is possible that variance in word choice might simply be an individual
difference with no bearing on attention at all. If this is the case, then the assumption that
elements reflecting focus of attention were present in the SCAS items is likely to have
been a faulty one.
A second potential explanation for the lack of a perceptible attentional focus
factor in the SCAS sample responses may involve biases inherent to the retrospective
format of the SCAS as it was administered in the current sample. Before responding to
the questions, sample participants were instructed to “think back to the last several times”

106
they gave public speeches and base their responses to the SCAS items on their recall of
these experiences. As such, participant responses are subject to retrospective biases that
might have significantly impacted the ability of the items to reflect certain aspects of the
actual experience of speaking in public.
Two observations raise the strong possibility that focus of attention elements may
be at particular risk to have been obscured by recall biases in the present study. The first
is that attention tends to be a fluid process, with frequent shifts being a natural aspect of
ordinary consciousness. As a result, changes in attention may be less subjectively
remarkable than changes in affect, which tend to be less common and are more widely
recognized to have a salient impact on current functioning. Thus, individuals may be less
likely to recognize or recall the fact that their attentional processes underwent a shift
upon entering a public speaking situation, while retaining memories of positive or
negative emotional experiences.
Secondly, the general lack of conscious awareness paid to focus of attention likely
results in a decreased likelihood that individuals will habitually attempt to self-regulate
their attentional processes, particularly in a cognitively demanding situation such as
speaking in public. The fact that focus of attention has been effectively manipulated in
experimental contexts using relatively simple interventions such as placing mirrors in
front of the subject (Scheier & Carver, 1983), mandating a particular type of speech
content (Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), and providing mock heart-rate
feedback (Pineles & Mineka, 2005) may speak to the lack of conscious effort most
individuals place upon maintaining control of these processes. Since self-regulation
processes appear to be particularly significant in goal-directed social behaviors such as
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public speaking, elements such as focus of attention that are not consciously regulated
may be less salient when respondents attempt to reconstruct their speaking-related
cognitive processes, making retrospective assessment more difficult.
A third possibility is that the failure to identify SCAS focus of attention factors in
the current sample may simply indicate that focus of attention in public speaking anxiety
does not display an orthogonal relationship to affective valence at the underlying factor
level. Although this may appear to be at odds with empirical findings supporting a
distinct role of self-focused attention in social anxiety (Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg,
1993; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), Clark and Wells‟
(1995) cognitive model of social anxiety can support a conceptualization that
accommodates both the present findings and those of previous studies. In this model,
anxiety in public speaking situations initially manifests as an affectively-valenced
cognitive response to the likelihood of negative evaluation by the audience. Changes in
attentional focus follow in response to this affective experience, and can serve to prolong
or attenuate anxiety depending on the elements which are focused upon more heavily.
The temporal sequence implies that the affective valence of cognitions is the primary
influence on public speaking anxiety, and that the focus of these cognitions is a
secondary process which may mainly influence the course of the anxiety experience.
Given the results of the current study, this reading of Clark and Wells‟ (1995)
model could suggest that focus of attention may display different effects within the
identified Positive, Negative, or Catastrophic cognitions, rather than displaying a general
orthogonal relationship to affective valence. In other words, focus of attention could
display significantly different effects depending on the particular affective valence of the
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cognition; for instance, self-focused negative cognitions might prolong an anxiety
response specifically through enhanced sensitivity to physiological responses, while selffocused positive cognitions might lessen anxiety by directly promoting a subjective sense
of competence or efficacy. If this is the case, it may suggest that focus of attention
effects depend on an interaction with affective valence that was not adequately captured
in the SCAS items, and may be difficult or impossible to measure through self-report
item in general.
Convergent and Discriminant Validity of SCAS Total Scores
The SCAS was designed in accordance with theories of cognitive assessment
(e.g. Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Glass, Merluzzi,
Biever, and Larsen, 1982) which hold that cognitions associated with particular
constructs can be used as items to create valid measures of these constructs. As such,
finding initial support for the validity of the SCAS in measuring public speaking anxiety
was another central goal of the current research. Within the current study, the outcome
measures employed to test convergent validity hypotheses were other self-report
measures of public speaking and social anxiety, specifically the Personal Report of
Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966), the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS;
Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS;
Watson & Friend, 1969), and the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson &
Friend, 1969).
While public speaking anxiety has been conceptualized (Clark & Wells, 1995;
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and empirically studied (Rodebaugh & Rapee, 2005; Wald &
Rodriguez, 2005; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000) from theoretical
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perspectives originally formulated to explain general interaction anxiety, it also displays
unique and distinguishing characteristics. Clinically, public speaking anxiety is
conceptualized as a specific subtype of Social Phobia in the DSM-IV (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994), and the prevalence of any form of anxiety is higher in
public speaking situations than in general interaction situations (Kessler, Stein, &
Berglund, 1998). The fact that many individuals who report significant anxiety while
speaking in public do not suffer anxiety in other social contexts (Pollard & Henderson,
1988) suggests that elements unique to the speaking situation or more pronounced within
it are particularly anxiety-provoking. This is a particularly important point in the current
study, as one of the main dictates of cognitive assessment (Clark, 1988; Glass & Arnkoff,
1994; Heimberg, 1994) is that the measure should display a high degree of situational
specificity with the construct of interest. This study utilized a variety of general and
specific convergent validity measures to assess whether the pattern of associations these
measures exhibited with the SCAS matched a profile consistent with the construct of
public speaking anxiety.
To do so, Pearson‟s r correlations were calculated between each discriminant
validity measure and the SCAS. The correlations were interpreted as measures of effect
size to facilitate comparisons regarding the magnitude of shared variance between the
SCAS and the other measures. The PRCS (Paul, 1966) displayed the largest amount of
shared variance with the SCAS in the current sample. Since the PRCS was the only
specific public speaking anxiety measure included in the current study, the level of
statistical similarity augurs well for the ability of the SCAS to measure public speaking
anxiety. More moderate amounts of shared variance were observed with the FNE and the
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SADS (Watson & Friend, 1969), which respectively measure cognitive and behavioral
aspects of general social anxiety. This result again matches expectations for the SCAS, as
general social anxiety is thought to be closely related to, but not synonymous with, the
processes involved in public speaking anxiety.
The effect size of the observed correlation between the SCAS and the public selfconsciousness subscale of the SCS (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) was lower than
expected. This subscale measures tendencies to focus on the self in social situations, a
construct that has demonstrated associations with social anxiety processes in the past
(Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Woody, 1996; Woody &
Rodriguez, 2000). However, the effect size of the association between the SCAS and the
private self-consciousness subscale of the SCS was not significantly different from zero.
This finding was consistent with expectations and demonstrates the discriminant validity
of the SCAS, since the construct of private self-consciousness is theoretically unrelated to
public speaking or other forms of social anxiety.
In general terms, the overall pattern of correlations supports the specificity of the
SCAS in measuring public speaking anxiety. The main point of departure from prediction
is the small size of the effect between the SCAS and the public self-consciousness
subscale of the SCS, which suggests that self-focusing tendencies do contribute to
variance in SCAS item responses, but that the contribution is relatively small. This
finding is particularly interesting in light of the previously discussed failure to identify
focus of attention elements in the factor structure of the SCAS, and provides further
evidence that the ability of the SCAS to measure focus of attention in public speaking
anxiety may be limited in key ways. Alternatively, the size of this effect may be due to
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the format of the study and general difficulties in conducting empirical investigation into
attentional focus using retrospective measures. Further research is needed to clarify the
factors involved in the relationship between attentional focus, speaking anxiety, and
measurement with the SCAS.
Comparison with Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker
As previously mentioned, the current study intended to create a measure of public
speaking anxiety with a more clearly defined theoretical and empirical basis than existing
measures of the construct. The potential advantages of the SCAS in this regard can be
discussed by drawing a detailed contrast with the Personal Report of Confidence of a
Speaker (Paul, 1966). The PRCS provides an excellent point of comparison with the
SCAS because it is an established and frequently used self-report measure of public
speaking anxiety (Philips, Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1997) and because it was administered
alongside the SCAS in the current sample as one of the main convergent validity
measures.
A high correlation of .87 was obtained in the current sample between the SCAS
and PRCS. As previously discussed, this degree of overlap is a good indicator of the
specificity and convergent validity of the SCAS, since the PRCS has demonstrated
relationships with public speaking anxiety in previous studies (Beck, et al., 2005; Paul,
1966; Wald & Rodriguez, 2005). However, it also raises valid questions about whether or
not the SCAS is functionally redundant with the PRCS in terms of its utility for
measuring and conceptualizing public speaking anxiety. A closer examination of the
differences in how the two scales were formulated and how each measures the construct
allows a clearer distinction to be drawn.
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Differences in formulation and item content. One of the largest differences
between the SCAS and PRCS is the method used to formulate each measure. The 30 item
PRCS in question (Paul, 1966) is actually a selection of the items from Gilkinson‟s
(1942) original 104-item Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker that were found to
have the greatest discriminant validity in identifying low and high speech-anxious
individuals. In turn, Gilkinson‟s (1942) items were generated solely by the author to be
face-valid in representing various degrees of fear and confidence in speaking at different
time periods relative to the speaking task. Paul‟s (1966) 30-item PRCS reflects this
diversity of foci, containing items that assess behaviors (Item 2, My hands tremble when I
try to handle objects on the platform), items that assess reactions before (Item 24, I
perspire and tremble just before getting up to speak), during (Item 26, I am fearful and
tense all the while I am speaking before a group of people), and after speaking (Item 6, At
the conclusion of a speech, I feel that I have had a pleasant experience), as well as items
that reflect personal preferences regarding aspects of the speaking situation (Item 13, I
prefer to have notes on the platform in case I forget my speech). In contrast, the SCAS
items were generated from the self-reported cognitions of undergraduate students
engaging in an in-vivo public speaking situation and focus narrowly on cognitive selfstatements made about an ongoing speaking situation (e.g. Item 20, This speech is making
me sweat). Cognitive assessment theory (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997; Glass &
Arnkoff, 1994; Glass, et al., 1982) suggests that using naturalistic items and taking a
narrower focus on in-vivo cognitions produces a more valid measurement of
psychological constructs, particularly for constructs such as social and performance
anxiety in which cognitions have been demonstrated to play a large role in the larger
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response (Alden, Bieling, and Wallace, 1994; Ayers, 1988; Beazley, Glass, Chambless, &
Arnkoff, 2001; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, and Dombeck, 1990; Mahone, Bruch, &
Heimberg, 1993).
Comparison of internal characteristics. The fact that the SCAS correlated very
highly with the PRCS despite the markedly narrower focus of the SCAS items is
consistent with the claim of cognitive assessment theory that specific measurement of
cognitive elements can capture relevant variance in speaking anxiety. A comparison of
Cronbach‟s alpha internal reliability statistics obtained for the SCAS and PRCS in the
sample indicates a value of α = .90 for the PRCS and a value of α = .97 for the SCAS.
Although both of these values indicate excellent internal reliability (Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994), the higher reliability estimate for the SCAS may be an indicator that the
measure has met its goal of measuring a more narrow and specific element of the public
speaking anxiety experience (Streiner, 2003). With regard to item composition, item-total
correlations (Table 8) in the current sample for nine PRCS items (Items 4, 13, 14, 17, 19,
20, 23, 24, and 30) fell below the minimum criteria of .5 suggested by Kline (1986), and
the highest observed item-total correlations were slightly above .6 (Items 6, 16, and 26).
In comparison, all 30 SCAS items display item-total correlations above .5, with the
highest observed correlations being slightly below .8 (Items 6, 12, 16, and 25). This
indicates that on the whole, the SCAS items are more consistent with total scores than the
PRCS items, and suggests that the SCAS items hold together better as a scale than do the
PRCS items.
Distributions in the current sample. A visual comparison of the distributions of
total scores on the SCAS (Figure 2) and PRCS (Figure 3) in the current sample indicates
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Table 8
Corrected Item-Total Correlations for the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker
(N = 367)
Corrected Item-Total
Item
Correlation

1. I look forward to an opportunity to speak in public.*

.51

2. My hands tremble when I try to handle objects on the platform.

.49

3. I am in constant fear of forgetting my speech.

.54

4. Audiences seem friendly when I address them.*

.32

5. While preparing a speech, I am in a constant state of anxiety.

.46

6. At the conclusion of a speech, I feel that I have had a pleasant experience.

.61

7. I dislike to use my body and voice expressively.

.43

8. My thoughts become confused and jumbled when I speak before an audience. .60
9. I have no fear of facing an audience.*

.52

10. Although I am nervous just before getting up, I soon forget my fears
and enjoy the experience.*

.55

11. I face the prospect of making a speech with complete confidence.*

.60

12. I feel that I am in complete possession of myself while speaking.*

.58

13. I prefer to have notes on the platform in case I forget my speech.

.20

14. I like to observe the reactions of my audience to my speech.*

.35

15. Although I talk fluently with friends I am at a loss for words on the platform. .55
16. I feel relaxed and comfortable while speaking.*

.61

17. Although I do not enjoy speaking in public, I do not particularly dread it.*

.18

Note. * denotes reverse-scored item.

(Table 8 continues)
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(Table 8 continued)
Item

Corrected Item-Total
Correlation

18. I always avoid speaking in public if possible.

.46

19. The faces of my audience are blurred when I look at them.

.22

20. I feel disgusted with myself after trying to address a group of people.

.27

21. I enjoy preparing a talk.*

.55

22. My mind is clear when I face an audience.*

.53

23. I am fairly fluent.*

.33

24. I perspire and tremble just before getting up to speak.

.41

25. My posture feels strained and unnatural.

.50

26. I am fearful and tense all the while I am speaking before a group of people.

.62

27. I find the prospect of speaking mildly pleasant.*

.51

28. It is difficult for me to calmly search my mind for the right words.
to express my thoughts.

.49

29. I am terrified at the thought of speaking before a group of people.

.58

30. I have a feeling of alertness in facing an audience.*

.14

Note. * denotes reverse-scored item.
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Figure 2. Distribution of scores on the 30-item final Speaking Cognitions and Attention
Scale in study sample (N = 367). Mean score is 49.7 (SD = 22.7).
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Figure 3. Distribution of scores on the Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker
(PRCS; Paul, 1966) in study sample (N = 367). Mean score is 13.5 (SD = 7.2).
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notable differences between the two measures. In the case of the PRCS, the mean score
of 13.5 appears to be heavily influenced by a pronounced mode of 15 at the exact center.
On each side of the mean, the distribution of scores is relatively flat around 10
observations, with peaks at scores of 5, 10, 20, and 25. For the SCAS, the mode of 38 is
not substantially more prominent in the distribution than the mean of 49.7, and the
distribution of scores on either side of the mean is more graded than that found in the
PRCS and more consistent with a bell-curve distribution. This distribution suggests that
total scores on the SCAS may do a better job of measuring speaking anxiety as a
continuous variable. This may be a manifestation of larger differences in how the two
measures were conceptualized, with Paul (1966) designing his version of the PRCS to
discriminate between low and high-anxious individuals using a variety of speakingrelated items and a dichotomous response format, while the SCAS was designed with a
continuous response format to measure the presence and prevalence of specific anxietyrelated cognitions.
Potential for future research applications. The current data indicate that the
internal characteristics of the SCAS compare favorably to those of the PRCS. Pending
further validation, this suggests that the SCAS is likely to be a useful tool in conducting
cross-sectional correlational research on public speaking anxiety and screening
individuals for public speaking fears. After further external validation using actual public
speaking situations, the SCAS may prove to be more adaptable to experimental scenarios
than the PRCS. While both scales conceive and measure public speaking anxiety as a
stable trait, the specific focus on in-vivo cognitions in the SCAS may allow for the
measure to be modified to measure cognitions in a specific speaking experience by
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changing the directions to reflect this and altering the response format to be appropriate
to the situation. Although doing so would necessitate that the scale be re-validated for
this purpose, the SCAS items themselves would likely be highly transportable, as they are
written in self-statement format. As noted above, the PRCS items tend to refer to general
tendencies rather than specific responses, and would be comparatively less suitable for
adaptation to the task of measuring state-specific public speaking anxiety. Should the
SCAS be empirically demonstrated to be adaptable in such a fashion, it could be usefully
employed as an outcome measure in future experimental research into public speaking
anxiety. While past research has utilized subjective units of distress (SUDS) ratings
(Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000) or customized rating scales (Savitsky &
Gilovich, 2003) to make group comparisons, SCAS scores could potentially serve the
same function with the added benefit of the increased construct specificity that
empirically-based cognitive assessment methods provide (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994). The
SCAS might also prove useful as a pretest-posttest measure of treatment changes,
provided its sensitivity to change can be adequately established in controlled research.
Potential for integration with speech-anxiety interventions. The unique properties
of the SCAS relative to the PRCS may have additional benefits in non-research contexts
where speech anxiety is a frequently encountered issue, such as clinical or educational
settings. One of the strengths of the continuous response format utilized by the SCAS is
that individual responses to the SCAS items can provide idiographic data about the
relative prevalence of specific cognitions in an individuals‟ speaking experience, giving
potentially important information about which cognitions contribute more to experiences
of anxiety. By contrast, the dichotomous response format of the PRCS cannot provide
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any information beyond whether or not the individual identifies with a particular scale
item. The additional information provided by examining the profile of responses on the
SCAS might be helpful in targeting educational or therapeutic interventions for speaking
anxiety. For example, an individual may obtain a normatively high total score on the
SCAS by endorsing that he or she „always‟ experiences thoughts of “freezing up,”
“trembling,” and “sweating” during speaking, while reporting less frequent concerns
related to the other negative thoughts on the scale. From this, the communication teacher
or clinician can focus special effort on helping this individual reduce body-related
concerns during speaking. In an explicitly clinically-focused setting, therapists might
elect to use responses to the SCAS items as the basis for an exposure hierarchy to
desensitize speech-anxious clients to specific performance concerns.
A second aspect of the SCAS that may prove beneficial in applied settings is that
the measure‟s exclusive focus on cognitions can provide a natural transition into
cognitive reframing exercises, which have proven effective in reducing social anxiety
(Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, & Becker,
1990). With regard to social anxiety treatment, cognitive reframing is a technique in
cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy wherein a sufferer alters anxiety-provoking thoughts
and assumptions by learning to identify and challenge them. For example, a speechanxious person who frequently thinks “I sound stupid talking to these people” might
challenge this thought by with “Most people will recognize that I‟m doing the best I can,
and won‟t hold a few slip-ups against me.” Since the SCAS items, unlike the PRCS
items, are written as first-person self-statements, they could easily be incorporated into
exercises designed to teach reframing to speech-anxious individuals. After administering
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the SCAS, a clinician or teacher might provide a speech-anxious person with basic
instruction on the relationship between negative thoughts and anxiety, and follow with an
exercise in which he or she generates relevant challenges to each of the negative
cognitions endorsed on the SCAS. Additionally, the speech anxious individual could be
coached into rehearsing thoughts in the SCAS Positive Performance Cognitions that may
have been reported as being low-prevalence (e.g. Item 19; I am doing well with the
speech) to increase confidence and reduce anxiety while speaking. An appropriately
validated protocol of this type could be paired with the SCAS and standardized for use in
university courses for students suffering from public speaking anxiety. Integrating
assessment and intervention for public speaking anxiety-related cognitions in this fashion
may help enable the creation of an empirically-validated treatment program for public
speaking anxiety that can be administered by educators and other non-clinicians. Such a
program might prove beneficial to individuals with mild to moderate levels of public
speaking anxiety in overcoming their fears without the need for professional
psychological intervention.
Future Directions
Further validation of measure properties. Although the results of the current
study give a positive initial indication for the reliability and convergent validity of the
SCAS, further research is necessary for the instrument to be considered truly wellvalidated. A clear initial concern is ensuring that the norms, distribution, validity
correlations, and reliability observed in this sample are replicable in other populations.
The future utility of the measure is highly dependent on its ability to retain good
psychometric properties across a variety of contexts. The three-factor structure found in
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the current analysis is of particular interest, since it may provide useful information about
the underlying structure of public speaking anxiety and variations therein if it proves to
be replicable. Re-administering the SCAS and the convergent validity measures to a
larger sample with the intent of performing a confirmatory factor analysis on the data
would be an important step toward meeting these goals.
Establishment of clinical norms. In a similar vein, examining the properties of the
SCAS in a population consisting solely of individuals who meet DSM-IV diagnostic
criteria for Social Phobia (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) would aid greatly in
providing clarification about how the measure performs in clinical populations. Such data
would allow for an examination of the robustness of the SCAS factor structure in
specifically speech-anxious populations, as well as helping to establish empirically-based
clinical norms and cutoff scores for the measure, which are highly relevant for the future
use of the measure in both research and treatment settings. A secondary question of
interest in such a study might be a comparison in total scores and response patterns
between individuals with a diagnosis of Social Phobia, generalized type and Social
Phobia, specific type for public speaking anxiety. Such data might yield valuable
information about whether or not the distinction between the subtypes translates to
differences in the severity or presentation of anxiety experienced specifically in public
speaking situations.
External validity studies. Another critical step in validating the SCAS is
establishing external validity by correlating SCAS total scores with direct measures of
subject anxiety and confidence during an actual public speaking task. Ideally, such a
study would administer the SCAS prior to a laboratory-controlled impromptu public
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speaking task, similar to the one employed in the initial collection of the self-statements
used as the basis for the SCAS items (Beck, Marin, Huber, & Rodriguez, 2005) and
afterward collect participant self-ratings of anxiety and confidence experienced during
the speech using a 0-100 Subjective Units of Distress scale. Such a study would serve the
necessary purposes of establishing support for the predictive validity of the SCAS and
providing further support for the construct validity of the measure in terms of its
relationship to public speaking anxiety (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Administering the
PRCS alongside the SCAS in such a study would provide another interesting point of
comparison between the two measures with respect to predictive validity, and could
potentially provide additional support for the general benefits of cognitive assessment
measures.
Focus of attention clarification. Experimental research might also be conducted to
obtain a more focused examination of the role of focus of attention in the SCAS factor
structure. As previously discussed, one potential explanation for the failure to find an
expected focus of attention effect in the factor structure of the SCAS may be due to the
effect of retrospective response biases. This theory could be tested by conducting an
experimental study in which participants are randomly assigned to complete the SCAS
either retrospectively or immediately after a public speaking task. Conducting
exploratory factor analyses on the two sets of data for the purposes of comparison would
provide a clear test of whether or not proximity to the speaking experience increases the
sensitivity of the SCAS to focus of attention effects. Alternatively, examining the
differences in SCAS total scores and factor structures between conditions in an
experimental paradigm designed to manipulate focus of attention, such as that used by
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Woody (1996) or Woody and Rodriguez (2000), may provide a more conclusive test of
the relationship between focus of attention during public speaking and responses to the
SCAS items. Replicating the factor structure of the SCAS under varied attentional focus
conditions would be a positive indicator for the robustness of the measure, and could
possibly contribute to a more detailed theoretical account of how focus of attention
interacts with other elements in the public speaking experience.
Possible clinical applications. Finally, the potential for integrating the SCAS into
a standardized treatment protocol for public speaking anxiety is deserving of empirical
study. Demonstrating the sensitivity of the SCAS in measuring changes in public
speaking anxiety over time would constitute a positive initial step toward achieving this
goal. This might be achieved by conducting a study in which speech anxious individuals
undergo a treatment for public speaking anxiety using cognitive and behavioral methods,
potentially similar to the group treatment utilized by Chambless, Tran, & Glass (1997).
Administering the SCAS along with a public speaking anxiety behavioral test at pretreatment, post-treatment, and follow-up would provide important data regarding the
ability of the SCAS to respond to treatment-influenced changes in speaking anxiety.
Establishing sensitivity to change would expand the range of uses for the SCAS beyond
screening and detection of public speaking anxiety to potential clinical research and
treatment applications. Given the empirical fashion in which the SCAS was developed,
the measure may evolve into a useful tool for validating emerging psychological
treatments for public speaking anxiety or to evaluate treatment progress in individuals
who are receiving clinical treatment for a diagnosis of social phobia, specific type.
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With appropriate further validation, the SCAS could also be integrated into
traditional individual psychotherapy for Social Phobia, specific type. Cognitive and
cognitive-behavioral techniques for treatment of clinically significant anxiety are in wide
use and have been supported with empirical evidence (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985;
Hofmann & Barlow, 2004). These treatments typically involve teaching anxious
individuals to recognize and challenge their anxiety-provoking thoughts to reduce the
severity of the anxiety, and exposing them repeatedly to the feared situation to reduce
avoidance tendencies. Given the cognitive focus of the SCAS, a clinician beginning
cognitive therapy for a severely speech-anxious individual could use the measure to
engage the client in a discussion of why particular thoughts are more anxiety provoking
than others during a speaking situation. After orienting the client to the therapy, the
SCAS items could be incorporated into exercises designed to help the client learn to
challenge the cognitions that are most relevant to his or her specific situation. For
example, a client who identifies Item 16 (The audience can tell that I am afraid) as a
frequently experienced cognition, might generate a cognitive challenge that states “most
people won‟t be looking closely enough at me to give it much thought.”
The SCAS might also prove clinically useful in encouraging the client to make
the transition to the exposure tasks that are a critical component of the therapy (Hofmann
& Barlow, 2004). A major issue in treatment of speaking anxiety is the difficulty of
convincing anxious individuals to willingly expose themselves to speaking situations
with sufficient frequency to allow for desensitization to occur (Rodebaugh & Chambless,
2004). Therefore, encouragement and reinforcement of participation in exposure
exercises is an important part of clinical treatment. To this end, the facilitative cognitions
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assessed in the reverse-scored SCAS items might be useful in providing speech anxious
clients with positive thoughts to rehearse before entering a speaking situation. For
instance, if a client reports that he or she does not often experience the thought reflected
in Item 19 (I’m doing well with the speech) this client could be instructed to rehearse this
thought and employ it during exposure tasks as a method of anxiety control. In doing so,
the therapist might point out to the client that facilitative thoughts can replace or limit the
amount of debilitative, anxiety-causing thoughts that the client experiences, connecting
the exposure and cognitively-based components of the treatment.
Possible educational applications. In addition, since the SCAS was developed
and initially validated using a general population sample, the measure might integrate
well with a short-term, targeted treatment for individuals with subclinical public speaking
anxiety. Given the high prevalence of speaking anxiety (Kessler, Stein, & Berglund,
1998), there is likely to be a large demand for effective relief, particularly in educational
settings where public speaking is required. One of the benefits of cognitive assessment
measures such as the SCAS is the greater level of integration that is possible with
cognitively-based interventions (Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997; Glass,
Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982) due to the focus on external validity. The development
and pilot testing of a standardized school-based intervention that integrates SCAS
screening, psychoeducation about the role of cognitions in speaking anxiety, cognitivereframing exercises, and speaking task exposure could lead to a method of efficiently and
effectively addressing public speaking fears in this population without the need for
professional psychotherapeutic intervention.
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CHAPTER 5
Summary and Conclusions
The current study successfully utilized exploratory factor analysis of responses
made to 35 cognitive self-statements gathered in a previous study (Beck, et al., 2005) to
form the Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale (SCAS), a 30-item measure of public
speaking anxiety. Data indicates that in the current sample, the SCAS displays a 3-factor
solution, reflecting items with positive, moderately negative, and extremely negative
emotional content respectively. The measure also exhibits good initial psychometric
properties, including excellent internal reliability and strong item-total correlations.
Convergent validity analyses provide a positive initial indication that the SCAS is
a valid and specific measure of anxiety during public speaking. The SCAS correlated
more strongly with a different questionnaire measure of public speaking anxiety than
with two measures of general social anxiety. Additionally, the SCAS showed no
mathematical relationship with a subscale measure of a construct theoretically unrelated
to public speaking anxiety, providing evidence for discriminant validity. Contrary to
prediction, the SCAS displayed only a small effect size of common variance with a
measure of self-focused attention, indicating that SCAS responses in the current sample
were not strongly influenced by attentional focus tendencies.
The results of the current study indicate that the SCAS may be a reliable and valid
measure of public speaking anxiety. In comparison to other questionnaire methods of
public speaking anxiety in wide use, the SCAS has been developed using empirical
methods of cognitive assessment, and utilizes items adapted from self-reported cognitions
of speech-anxious individuals. As such, the SCAS may be able to provide a more specific
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and valid measure of public speaking anxiety than measures developed using other
means. Furthermore, the SCAS may also be more adaptable to varying research and
clinical contexts due to its specific focus on cognitive correlates of speaking anxiety.
These results are limited by the retrospective nature of sample responses, and
further research is needed to establish the validity of the SCAS in predicting anxiety in
actual public speaking tasks. More research is also needed to replicate the factor structure
found in the current sample, particularly with regard to the lack of attentional focus
elements in the factor structure of the presently obtained sample. Once the reliability and
validity of the SCAS is more firmly established with different samples, research is
needed to substantiate the measure‟s utility for integration with clinical and educational
interventions for public speaking anxiety.
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Appendix A
Final 30- Item Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale
This questionnaire looks at how people respond to giving a speech or presentation
in public. Before you respond to the items in the questionnaire, take a minute and think
back to the last several times you gave a speech in public. This could be a classroom
presentation, at a formal occasion, or any other situation that involves you speaking
before an audience. How did you feel as you were about to give the speech? What sort of
things were you thinking about? While you were speaking, how did you feel during the
speech? What thoughts were going through your head? Now, please respond to the
following statements by indicating how well they describe your experiences when
speaking in public.

1. I feel anxious giving this speech.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

2. I look stupid to the audience.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

3. I am starting to feel uneasy.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

4. The audience sees that I am calm.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always
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5. I am scared of this entire situation.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

6. I think I‟m doing well.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

7. They can see that I am anxious.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

8. My body feels really hot.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

9. I sound stupid talking to these people.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

10. I look confident standing up here.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

11. I am trembling standing up here.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

12. The audience can tell that I am afraid.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always
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13. They think I am doing well.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

14. My voice sounds timid.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

15. I am doing well with the speech.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

16. This speech is making me sweat.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

17. I am panicking; I want to get out of here.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

18. I look comfortable giving this speech.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

19. I hope I don‟t look stupid in front of these people.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

20. I‟m going to freeze up.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always
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21. I am comfortable giving this speech.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

22. They can see that I am uncomfortable.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

23. I am calm while standing in front of this audience.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

24. The speech I am giving is horrible.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

25. I look stiff to the audience.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

26. I am confident with my performance.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

27. This isn‟t so bad.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

28. I am uncomfortable giving this speech.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

29. I look confident to them.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always
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30. The audience sees that I am doing a bad job.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always
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Appendix B
Prospective Items for Speaking Cognitions and Attention Scale
This questionnaire looks at how people respond to giving a speech or presentation
in public. Before you respond to the items in the questionnaire, take a minute and think
back to the last several times you gave a speech in public. This could be a classroom
presentation, at a formal occasion, or any other situation that involves you speaking
before an audience. How did you feel as you were about to give the speech? What sort of
things were you thinking about? While you were speaking, how did you feel during the
speech? What thoughts were going through your head? Now, please respond to the
following statements by indicating how well they describe your experiences when
speaking in public.

1. I feel anxious giving this speech.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

2. I look stupid to the audience.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

3. I am starting to feel uneasy.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

4. My eyes are wandering all over the room.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always
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5. The audience sees that I am calm.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

6. I am scared of this entire situation.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

7. I look stiff as a board standing here.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

8. I think I‟m doing well.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

9. I hope I don‟t stutter while speaking.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

10. They can see that I am anxious.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

11. My body feels really hot.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

12. I sound stupid talking to these people.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always
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13. I look confident standing up here.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

14. They think I am talking too fast.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

15. I am trembling standing up here.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

16. The audience can tell that I am afraid.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

17. They think I am doing well.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

18. My voice sounds timid.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

19. I am doing well with the speech.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

20. This speech is making me sweat.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always
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21. I am panicking; I want to get out of here.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

22. I look comfortable giving this speech.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

23. I hope I don‟t look stupid in front of these people.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

24. I‟m going to freeze up.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

25. I am comfortable giving this speech.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

26. They can see that I am uncomfortable.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

27. I am calm while standing in front of this audience.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

28. The speech I am giving is horrible.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always
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29. I look stiff to the audience.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

30. I am confident with my performance.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

31. I keep fidgeting with my hands.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

32. This isn‟t so bad.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

33. I am uncomfortable giving this speech.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

34. I look confident to them.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always

35. The audience sees that I am doing a bad job.
0 ------------------- 1 ---------------- 2 ------------------ 3 ----------------------- 4
Never

Not in most cases,
but occasionally

About half the time

More often
than not

Always
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